Spirit of Religion

  • Sheldon Gellar


For Tocqueville, religious faith was an inherent part of human nature and not about to disappear. Religion would survive in democratic times because religious beliefs were deeply rooted in the heart of man, especially the common man. Rather than experiencing greater secularization and decline in religious sentiments with the advance of urbanization and Western education, postcolonial Senegal underwent a period of intense Islamization of society.


Presidential Election Religious Education Islamic Republic Islamic Education Family Code 
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Chapter Eight Spirit of Religion

  1. 4.
    For Ahmadou Bamba’s ideas during the early development of the Mouride Brotherhood, see Cheikh Anta Mbacké Babou, “Autour de la Génèse du Mouridisme,” in Islam et Sociétés au sud du Sahara Vol. 13, No. 1 (1999), pp. 5–38.Google Scholar
  2. 11.
    For the importance of tolerance for Tijanis, see Amadou Makhtar Samb, Introduction d la Tarigah Tidiniyya ou voie spirituelle de CheikhAhmad Tidjani (Dakar: Imprimerie Saint-Paul, 1994), pp. 94–97.Google Scholar
  3. 19.
    For a detailed analysis of the conflicts among orthodox Muslims and the Qadiri and Tijani Brotherhoods in Nigeria, see Roman Loimeier, Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1997).Google Scholar
  4. 23.
    For the roots of these Islamic Associations, see Muriel Gomez-Perez, “Associations Islamiques à Dakar,” Islam et Sociétés au Sud du Sahara, No. 5 (November 1991), pp. 5–19.Google Scholar
  5. 24.
    For Dièye’s activities in France, see Donal Cruise O’Brien, “Charisma Comes to Town: Mouride Organization 1945–1986,” in Donal Cruise O’Brien and Christian Coulon (eds.), Charisma and Brotherhoods in African Islam (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 146–147.Google Scholar
  6. 25.
    For the origin and spread of Wahabi influences in West Africa, see Lansiné Kaba, The Wahabiyya: Islamic Reform and Politics in French West Africa (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974).Google Scholar
  7. 26.
    For the rise of the Moustarchadine Movement, see Leonardo Villalôn, “Senegal: The Crisis of Democracy and the Emergence of an Islamic Opposition,” in Leonardo Villalon and Phillip Huxtable (eds.), Critical Juncture: the African State between Disintegration and Reconfiguration (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, Publishers, 1998), pp. 143–166.Google Scholar
  8. 28.
    For more on this phenomenon, see Malick Ndiaye, Les Méodu-Méodu ou l’éthos du développement au Sénégal (Dakar: Presses Universitaires de Dakar, 1998).Google Scholar
  9. 40.
    For a detailed critique of the secular state in Senegal and Western-style democracy and discussion of the principles underlying the Islamic state, see Cheikh Oumar Tall, Islam: Engagement politique et Démocratie (Dakar: Les Presses de la Sénégalaise de l’Imprimerie, 1997).Google Scholar
  10. 41.
    Moustapha Sy, leader of the Moustarchadines, used language close to that of the Islamists in attacking the Diouf regime in 1993. For a translation and discussion of Sy’s 1993 speech attacking Diouf, see Leonardo Villalôn and Ousemane Kane, “Entre confrérisme, réformisme, et Islamisme, les mustarshidin du Sénégal,” in Ousemane Kane and Jean-Louis Triaud (eds.), Islam et Islamismes au Sud du Sahara (Paris: Karthala, 1998), pp. 263–310.Google Scholar

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© Sheldon Gellar 2005

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  • Sheldon Gellar

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