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Targeting Money Laundering: Global Approach or Diffusion of Authority?

  • Eleni Tsingou

Abstract

The goal of a large number of criminal acts is to generate profit for the individual or group that carries out the act. Money laundering is the processing of these criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin”—thus is money laundering defined in the official documentation of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on Money Laundering, an official body created in 1989 as international efforts to deal with this issue intensified. This definition goes to the heart of a dual problem: tackling money laundering is important in order to address organized crime such as drug trafficking, arms sales, and, most recently, terrorism. At the same time, detection is problematic because the financial transactions at stake mostly follow regular procedures; it is the way that funds are generated and the way in which they might be used that could be irregular.

Keywords

Organize Crime Money Laundering Global Public Good Transnational Organize Crime Financial Crime 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

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Copyright information

© Elke Krahmann 2005

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  • Eleni Tsingou

There are no affiliations available

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