Humanitarians and Mercenaries: Partners in Security Governance?

  • Christopher Spearin

Abstract

Post-Cold War security governance makes for strange bedfellows. This is because, increasingly, the obligation of providing security no longer rests predominantly with the state.1 States are downloading responsibilities onto non-state actors and other opportunities are arising in which these actors can operate. Accordingly, how security is provided, by whom, in what combinations, and to what effect should be the foci of study. As such, this chapter provides a specific analysis of interaction between humanitarian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and a modern form of mercenaries: international private security companies (PSCs).2

Keywords

Migration Coherence Expense Product Line Stein 

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Notes

  1. 1.
    See Elke Krahmann, “Private Firms and the New Security Governance,” Conflict, Security and Developments 5, no. 2 (2005): forthcoming.Google Scholar
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    Leura Peterson, “Privatizing Combat, the New World Order,” The Center for Public Integrity, October 28, 2002, 8. The author also notes that in May 2002, the Justice Department of the United States issued new guidelines that allow companies to challenge the release of information through freedom of information requests, thus further hindering public disclosure.Google Scholar
  10. 72.
    See U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation 2001–02 (London: Stationery Office, February 12, 2002); Chaloka Beyani and Damian Lilly, Regulating Private Military Companies: Options for the UK Government (London: International Alert, 2001).Google Scholar
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    Martin Barber, “Private Security Companies and Humanitarian Assistance,” in The Privatization of Security: Framing a Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Policy Agenda—the Report of the Wilton Park Conference (London: International Alert, 2001), 35.Google Scholar
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Copyright information

© Elke Krahmann 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Christopher Spearin

There are no affiliations available

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