The FAR and the United States: Confidence Building in Limited but Important Sectors

  • Hal Klepak
Part of the Studies of the Americas book series (STAM)


This chapter deals with confidence building and confidence-building measures (CBMs) in the context of the ongoing dispute between the United States and Cuba over a wide range of historic, political, and economic matters.1 The very idea of a look at such an activity as confidence building in such an intractable and long lasting conflict may strike the reader as, to say the least, odd and perhaps even foolhardy. After all, one side sees the other as determined to destroy it at whatever cost and however long it takes, while the second party sees its opponent as an incorrigibly evil regime in which one can never have any real faith.2 This is not the stuff of which normal confidence building is generally constructed.


United States Armed Force Illegal Immigration Military Officer Bilateral Relationship 
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© Hal Klepak 2005

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  • Hal Klepak

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