China and Inter-Korean Relations: Beijing as Balancer

Abstract

Since 1949 the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has played an important function as balancer on the Korean peninsula. Particularly since the late 1980s, Beijing has served a key constructive role in reducing tensions and facilitating reconciliation between Seoul and Pyongyang. There are, however, limitations to China’s role in Korean conflict management linked to its policy preferences vis-à-vis the Korean peninsula and desired political outcomes on the peninsula. While Beijing’s enlightened self-interest has fueled its constructive involvement on the peninsula, self-interest and extreme aversion to rapid major change also constrain the extent of its contribution. Indeed, Chinese diplomacy tends to eschew bold transformational initiatives in preference for efforts that are far more conservative and aimed at maintaining the status quo. This tendency by Beijing toward excessive caution is even more in evidence as a leadership transition from the so-called third generation headed by Jiang Zemin to the fourth generation headed by Hu Jintao is underway. And China’s national interests vis-à-vis inter-Korean relations dictate a preference for what might be dubbed peninsular conflict management without swift resolution.

The views expressed here are solely those of the author and do not represent those of the U.S. government, Department of Defense, or U.S. Army.