Abstract
Japan has embarked on the course of acquiring a ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability in cooperation with the United States. In December 1998, Tokyo announced its decision to participate in technical research for the NTW defense program. The NTW system, which will be mounted on Aegis cruisers/destroyers, represents the U.S. Navy’s candidate for “upper-tier” defenses intended to engage incoming theater ballistic missiles in high altitudes. The development of NTW will proceed as the Sea-Based Midcourse Program under the Bush administration. For “lower-tier,” or low-altitude intercept, the Defense Agency of Japan is apparently considering introduction of the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3, which is being developed for the U.S. Army to engage short-range missiles, although no formal decision has been made yet.1
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Boeicho, Dando misairu boei (BMD) ni kansuru kenkyu ni tsuite, July 28, 2000 (http://www.jda.go.jp/j/library/archives/bmd/bmd.pdf) gives an official account of Japan’s participation in the NTW research. For a detailed analysis of various issues related to Japanese involvement in BMD, see Michael Swaine, Rachel Swanger, and Takashi Kawakami, Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense (Rand Corporation, June 2001).
Patrick M. Cronin, Paul S. Giarra, and Michael J. Green, “The Alliance Implications of Theater Missile Defense,” in Green and Cronin, eds., The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999); Satoshi Morimoto, Ken Jimbo, Ken Suzuki, and Yoichiro Koizumi, “Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and Japan’s Security,” Plutonium, No. 20 (Winter 1998) (http://www.cnfc.or.jp/pl20/lecture.e.html);
Michael O’Hanlon, “Theater Missile Defense and the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” in Mike, M. Mochizuki, ed., Toward a True Alliance: Restructuring U.S.-Japan Security Relations (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997); and
Yamashita Masamitsu, Takai Susumu, and Iwata Shuichiro, TMD: Sen’iki dando misairu boei (Tokyo: TBS Britannica, 1994), chapters 8–10 are also useful.
Possible use of Aegis vessels for U.S. homeland defense is discussed in Prepared Statement of Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish, USAF, Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization on “The Ballistic Missile Defense Program: Amended Fiscal year 2002 Budget” before the Senate Armed Services Committee, July 12, 2001. See also Ronald O’Rourke, “Sea-Based Boost” and “Sea-Based Midcourse,” in Missile Defense: The Current Debate, coordinated by Steven A. Hildreth and Amy F. Woolf, Congressional Research Service, January 16, 2002.
For an overview of the missile defense issue in East Asia, see Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Theater Missile Defense in Northeast Asia: An Annotated Chronology, 1990-present, June 2001 (http://cns.miis.edu/research/neasia/index.htm);
Kenneth W. Allen et al., Theater Missile Defenses in the Asia-Pacific Region: A Henry L. Stimson Center Working Group Report, Henry L. Stimson Center, June 2000;
Robert D. Shuey, Shirley A. Kan, and Mark Christofferson, Missile Defense Options for Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan: A Review of the Defense Department Report to Congress, Congressional Research Service, November 30, 1999; and Stephen A. Cambone, “The United States and Theater Missile Defence in North-east Asia,” Survival, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Autumn 1997).
According to the U.S. intelligence community, Russia in 2015 will most likely have less than 2,000 deployed strategic nuclear weapons, most of which will be mounted on ICBMs. Russia currently maintains nearly 4,000 warheads on its ICBMs and SLBMs. National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat through 2015: Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate, December 2001. Moscow proposes that Washington and Moscow should curtail their strategic nuclear arsenals to about 1,500 to 2,200 warheads each. On the other hand, it is widely expected that the Russians will respond to missile defense undertakings by the United States by retaining some of their multiple-warhead ICBMs, which they have agreed to withdraw as part of the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II).
For an illustration of the potential capacity of NTW to counter long-range ballistic missiles, see Dean A. Wilkening, Ballistic-Missile Defence and Strategic Stability (Adelphi Paper 334), International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 2000, pp. 53–58. A somewhat more cautious assessment is given in U.S. Department of Defense, Summary of Report to Congress on Utility of Sea-Based Assets to National Missile Defense, June 1, 1999. In a report released in March 2001, the Pentagon’s Office of Operational Test and Evaluation stressed difficulties in modifying NTW to give it the ability to engage long-range ballistic missiles. Wade Boese, “Pentagon Report Highlights Hurdles for Missile Defenses,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 31, No. 3 (April 2001).
For a comprehensive analysis of the Chinese missile forces, see Shirley A. Kan, China: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles, Congressional Research Service, August 2000. According to this source, which classifies the DF-4 as an MRBM, China currently has no IRBMs. Sources such as The Military Balance, 2001–2002 (Oxford/London: Oxford University Press/International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001); and Chugoku soran 2000-nen ban (Tokyo: Kazankai, 2000) place the DF-4 in the category of IRBM. The Defense Agency of Japan apparently makes no distinction between the MRBM and the IRBM when it says: “China possesses approximately 100 intermediate-range missiles whose ranges cover the Asian region including Japan.” Defense of Japan 2001, p. 52.
For a concise account of China’s military and national strategies, see U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China: Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, June 23, 2000; as well as Asano Ryo, “Chugoku no gunji senryaku no hokosei,” Kokusai mondai, No. 492 (March 2001); and Abe Jun’ichi, “21-seiki no higashi ajia anzen hosho kankyo no naka no chugoku fakuta: chugoku no gun kindaika to TMD wo chushin ni,” Shin boei ronshu, Vol. 27, No. 4 (March 2000). Most of the Chinese criticism at U.S.-Japan cooperation in BMD may be understood as deriving from such strategies. Kori J. Urayama, “Chinese Perspectives on Theater Missile Defense: Policy Implications for Japan,” Asian Survey, Vol. 40, No. 4 (July/August 2000) enumerates the concerns expressed by the Chinese.
Michael O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), p. 81. In an ideal condition, a properly positioned Aegis destroyer might be able to intercept more than 100 ballistic missiles. Normally, however, Aegis ships must be prepared to deal with aircraft and cruise missiles as well.
Testimony of General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander in Chief United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command, and Commander, United States Forces Korea before the House Committee on Armed Services, March 15, 2000. See also “Kitachosen nodon 100-ki wo haibi: kankokushi hodo,” Yomiuri Shinbun, March 2, 2001 (evening edition); and Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001, p. 11.
Michishita Narushige, “Chosen hanto ni okeru tairyo hakai heiki mondai,” in Naya Masatsugu and Umemoto Tetsuya, eds., Tairyo hakai heiki fukakusan no kokusai seijigaku (Tokyo: Yushindo, 2000) gives a concise account of the North Korean ballistic missile and WMD capabilities.
Such concern is expressed in Cronin, Giarra, and Green, “The Alliance Implications,” p. 182; Morimoto Satoshi, Anzen hosho-ron: 21-seiki no kiki kanri (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo, 2000), p. 435; and
Michael J. Green and Katsuhisa Furukawa, “New Ambitions, Old Obstacles: Japan and Its Search for an Arms Control Strategy,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 30, No. 6 (July/August 2000), p. 19.
Such factors behind the U.S. interest in BMD are noted in John Pike, “Theater Missile Defense Programs: Status and Prospects,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 24, No. 7 (September 1994), p. 11; and
Ogawa Shin’ichi, “Beikoku no sen’iki misairu boei (TMD) keikaku,” in Morimoto Satoshi, ed., Misairu boei: kokusai anzen hosho no atarashii kozu (Tokyo: Nihon kokusai mondai kenkyujo, 2002), p. 79
For a concise history of the official construction of the Japanese constitution with regard to the right of collective self-defense, see Sakaguchi Kiyoshi, “Shudanteki jieiken ni kansuru seifu kaishaku no keisei to tenkai: sanfuranshisuko kowa kara wangan senso made,” Gaiko jiho, No. 1330 (July/August 1996) and No. 1331 (September 1996). Sase Masamori, Shudanteki jieiken: ronso no tame ni (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo, 2001) offers a pungent criticism on the government’s interpretation.
In 1994, the Pentagon put the research and development and acquisition costs for a Japanese antimissile capability at $4.5 billion to $16.3 billion (between 500 billion and 2 trillion yen, at the average exchange rate in 2001). Malcolm O’Neill, Ballistic Missile Defense: Options for Japanese TMD, U.S. Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, June 13, 1994. More recent “total cost estimates” (presumably including the expenditures for operations and maintenance as well as research and development and acquisition) of the Japanese government reportedly vary from $10 billion to $50 billion (roughly from 1.2 to 6 trillion yen). Swaine et al., Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense, p. 67.
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© 2003 G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi
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Tetsuya, U. (2003). Ballistic Missile Defense and the U.S.-Japan Alliance. In: Ikenberry, G.J., Inoguchi, T. (eds) Reinventing the Alliance: U.S.-Japan Security Partnership in an Era of Change. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403980199_9
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