Hit happens. A rip, a quick cut by a razor. From the outside, something breaks through and in: an intervention into the stabilized form of psychic life. As if by fate or chance: disturbance, disruption—what will be felt as pain, a crisis or breakdown. A punch in the guts, a violation, a horrible, helpless, caught in the grips of. A terror, an after-awe, an anguish of ruination. Defensively: deflection, mis-recognition. Look, the birds are on fire. We are forced, overwhelmed, blown away. We hit a wall, crash, are shredded. And we come out on the other side, spilling down, ash and glass. And not even then, but only later, the question: what the…? Insistence, return, rehearsal, reenactment. Compulsive repeating: replay, rewind, replay. Mediations and remediations that still veer away. Then, maybe, a reach, a throw. In a potlatch of words and images, something like an approach. Out of which, maybe, a capture, a first remembering-forgetting of representation, the work of emplotment. Then, maybe, testing, reflection, analysis, judgment: a passage back, from the disturbed body to the shared word.


Assure Assimilation Straw Ghost Opium 


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