U.S. Pacific Command: A Warrior-Diplomat Speaks

Abstract

In 1983 I was appointed CINCPAC—Commander in Chief, Pacific forces. In some ways the nomination was out of the ordinary. If there was a pattern for those who reached the upper levels of Navy command, I did not fit it. I was not prominent in my warfighting community; I was a diesel submariner in a nuclear community. Although I still wore my dolphins, I had had nothing to do with the submarine force since my days with Division 31, 16 years earlier. Many nuclear submariners, I knew, didn’t even consider diesel veterans as submariners at all. I had had little direct experience in building the Navy. I was not an equipment specialist or a weapons technician. My career did little to stamp me as a traditional “Navy Man.” I received a Ph.D. from Princeton instead of going to nuclear power school. On the other hand, I did have substantial joint, strategic, and command experience. Before moving to the Pacific, I commanded NATO forces in southern Europe. The Pacific Command was a major joint organization with broad political responsibilities in a region I knew well. I felt especially prepared to assume command of all American military forces in the Pacific theater.

An early version of this chapter appeared as chapter 5 in William J. Crowe, 1993, The Line of Fire: From Washington to the Gulf, the Politics and Battles of the New Military, New York: Simon & Schuster