Better, Worse, or Just Different? Legislative Fractionalization in Mixed Systems

Abstract

Since the adoption of mixed systems in many of the new democracies that emerged from the rubble of the Berlin Wall and in a number of countries with established democratic records, many scholars have theorized about the consequences that mixed systems exert on the configuration of national party systems. The normative judgments made by practitioners and academics alike about the “goodness” or “badness” of mixed electoral institutions have mostly been based on predictions about the kinds of party systems that these election rules should engender. Few, however, have investigated this issue cross-nationally. If mixed systems are to be judged based on their representativeness and their ability to produce cabinet stability, coherent and identifiable governing majorities, and a balance between local and national interests (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001b), no such evaluation can be complete without a thorough assessment of the kinds of legislatures they spawn.