Comparative Perspectives: South Africa, Poland, and China

  • John W. Schiemann
Part of the Political Evolution and Institutional Change book series (PEIC)


That the independence and power of the Hungarian constitutional court has been called a “happy surprise” of Hungary’s negotiated transition reflects the more general assessment that pact-making in Hungary was the exception that proved an unfortunate rule: the regime usually wins pacted transitions.1 The attention, if not the emphasis, on opposition cau­tion and regime power in the democratization literature is warranted, and explanations of pact-making dynamics must account for these less happy outcomes as well.This chapter attempts to do so by examining the other possible combinations of opposition and regime negotiators: an opposition and regime both risk-averse, a risk-averse opposition facing risk-taking softliners, and a risk-taking opposition matched by risk-taking regime softliners.


Comparative Perspective Veto Power Student Movement Apartheid Regime Hunger Strike 
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© John W. Schiemann 2005

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  • John W. Schiemann

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