Eternal Iran pp 139-158 | Cite as

Foreign Relations Under Khatami

  • Patrick Clawson
  • Michael Rubin
Part of the The Middle East in Focus book series (MEF)

Abstract

Since Mohammad Khatami’s 1997 election as president, Iran’s relations with the United States have not improved much if at all. Early optimism for a real thaw in Iran’s relations with Europe also did not fully materialize. Despite its high hopes, the West has not been able to help the reform cause in Iran. Nor is the evidence very encouraging about the ability of the West to persuade Iran, either through incentives or pressure, to change those Iranian policies to which the West objects. Both the European Union and the United States have said that full normalization of relations with Iran will depend on progress on curbing Iran’s pursuit of nonconventional weapons, disruption of the Arab-Israeli peace process, and its passive and active support for jihadist terrorists such as al-Qaeda and the jihadists in post-Saddam Iraq.

Keywords

Uranium Explosive Argentina Plutonium Dispatch 

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Notes

  1. 2.
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Copyright information

© Patrick Clawson and Michael Rubin 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Patrick Clawson
  • Michael Rubin

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