Mind the Gap
In the unseemly maneuvering over money at the December 1950 Brussels meeting, the strategic content of the MTDP, such as it was, faded from view altogether. Its real significance in any case lay in its installation of a division of labor in which American professions of ardor for NATO’s ground forces concealed that its strategic thinking was still atomic and unilateral.The MTDP, NSC 68, and the Korean War, pointing as they all did toward more reliance on conventional forces, concealed this paradox. The Europeans meanwhile had no incentives to call the bluff because to do so would have unraveled a relationship they desperately needed. Not until the end of the Korean War,was it obvious that the MTDP was a shell.
KeywordsUnited States Nuclear Weapon Atomic Bomb Strategic Thinking Great Debate
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