Constitutionalism, Democracy and the European Union

Abstract

A key problem of democratic politics is that there may be grounds for placing limits on what are considered to be the normal democratic decision-rules of a political system. There are obvious reasons for wanting to define such grounds restrictively. Yet the problem cannot be avoided altogether for the simple reason that some values that are not explicitly democratic — the rule of law, rights and the protection of minorities — may need to be constitutionally guaranteed as a precondition for democracy itself (Dworkin, 1996; Habermas, 1996, pp. 84–104). Thus, as Yves Meny (2002, p. 4) puts it, ‘an ideal democracy … is neither a purely popular democracy nor a purely constitutionalist one, but rather a system able to realise a satisfactory equilibrium between them two’. In addition, certain public welfare decisions are not easily made incentive compatible with the pursuit of elected office. Even a suspicion that policies needing long-term commitment may not be honoured tomorrow may be enough to sap their credibility and effectiveness today. Such objectives may suffer from ‘time-inconsistency’ problems unless entrusted to those whose behaviour is unaffected by electoral cycles (Majone, 2001, p. 106).