Give Peace a Chance: on the Way to the Ceasefire

Abstract

During the 1990s, the decline of radical nationalism, the military and political weakness of ETA, and the pressure articulated by the peace movement were some of the factors which helped shape favourable circumstances for new efforts towards peace in the Basque Country. Yet, other elements were still necessary in order to mobilize the structure of Basque politics and to operationalize the new opportunities. Scholars like Sydney Tarrow or Charles Tilly¹ have emphasized different kinds of alteration within the ruling elite as some of the most decisive triggers of mobilization. Conflicts between elite groups, the shift of traditional political alignments and, consequently, the availability of new allies are some of the theoretical ingredients usually mentioned by authors close to the political opportunity structure theory. My point is that in the explanation of the 1990s political process in the Basque Country, besides the factors indicated above, this triple alteration of the Basque political system was the most important catalyst which definitively mobilized Basque politics and kick-started the process leading to the truce of the summer of 1998. Translated into the Basque context, the triple alteration produced the crisis and final breakdown of the relationship between nationalists and non-nationalists, the rapprochement between moderate and radical nationalism, and, finally, the open alliance between both sectors of Basque nationalism. Since in the eyes of Basque nationalists the Irish example seemed to corroborate the political efficiency of this new strategy not only in terms of new parliamentary majorities, but also as a means of de-escalating violence, a further important argument was available to continue exploring the possibilities of the new pan-nationalist strategy. The question of how to tackle the problem of ETA prisoners offered a first opportunity to bring together both branches of Basque nationalism.