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The Path to the World Bank’s Anti-Corruption Programme, 1981–1997

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Corruption, Politics and Development

Part of the book series: International Political Economy Series ((IPES))

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Abstract

Conditionality in aid is not a new phenomenon, and there is extensive literature about it. Different analysts offer different definitions. Nherere defines conditionality as ‘the granting, withholding, suspension or reduction of economic aid, or other benefits, being made conditional upon the recipient country’s performance against other standards’,1 whereas Mosley defines it as ‘negotiation with the recipient government of a set of changes in economic policy that the recipient must implement in return for a loan or grant’.2 Gordon refers to conditionality as a set of ‘agreements between donors and recipients that exchange financial transfers (either grants or loans) by the donors for policy changes by the recipients’.3 Karl and Schmitter define it as ‘linking specific rewards explicitly to the meeting of specific norms, or even to the selection of specific institutions’.4 Hewitt and Killick describe it as ‘leverage’ to achieve policy change.5 To simplify, conditionality can be defined as a system of rewards and punishments. Funding is received for meeting the donor’s objectives, with sanctions applied if the objectives are not met. There are several ways to apply negative sanctions: withholding grants and loans, terminating funds and technical support for projects in progress, restrictions on trade or economic and political sanctions.

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Notes

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  228. The bulk of this section is drawn from Galtung, F. and Pope, J. (1999), ‘The Global Coalition Against Corruption’, pp. 257–82. The reason for this is quite simple — there is no other large-scale study of the organization, despite the important role it has played in bringing international attention to corruption. Work that has been done tends to focus solely on the CPI and its methodology. One exception, cited within Galtung and Pope, is a 1996 piece by Espinosa, entitled ‘Corrupción: una agenda necesaria’, in Espinosa, S. (ed.), Corrupción: Epidemia de fin de siglo (Quinto: ILDIS, Cedep, & Fundacion J. Peralta), pp. 77–93. He is quoted in Galtung and Pope as saying that TI is hija legitima de padre neoliberal y de madre modernizadora tanto porque la transparencia es una condición de credibilidad para el processo privatizador, para la inversiOn extranjera y para la ayuda internacional al desarollo, como porque los neoliberales han hecho de la afinidad y mutua apetencia entre Estado omnipotente y corrupciOn un eficaz instrumento de propaganda sobre la necesidad de reducir el tamatio del estado. (Espinosa, p. 82; cited in Galtung and Pope, note 13, p. 280) Roughly translated, Espinosa says that TI is ‘the legitimate daughter of the neoliberal father and modernization mother, so much because transparency is a condition of credibility for the privatization process, for external influence and for international aid for development; also because the neoliberals have made an affinity and mutual link between the omnipotent State and corruption an efficient instrument of propaganda about the necessity to reduce the size of the state’. Galtung and Pope offer no further analysis on this quite stark observation on Espinosa’s part. 242 Galtung, F. and Pope, J. (1999), ‘The Global Coalition Against Corruption’, pp. 257–8. 243 Galtung, F. and Pope, J. (1999), ‘The Global Coalition Against Corruption’, p. 258. In a footnote to the above passage, Galtung and Pope write: The prohibition against taking political considerations into account in lending decisions was clearly designed to provide protection for countries with one-party state systems of government — monarchies and the like — and to prevent discrimination on constitutional grounds. In our view, it cannot reasonably be read as excluding the Bank from taking into account the likelihood that elites would loot the treasury and distort public decisions, leaving the people of the country to meet the costs. We see their view as substantiated by the Bank’s 180-degree U-turn on the issue and this without any amendment to the charter. (note 3, p. 279) The authors do not address the historical context behind the inclusion of the non-political mandate in the Bank’s Articles nor its role in protecting the Bank itself against outside political influence, shielding it from external criticism and ensuring its integrity on the world’s capital markets. 244 Personal communication. 245 A senior World Bank staff member told me that the memo received in reply was a ‘very big slap on the wrist for even daring to become involved in this nonsense’. 246 Galtung, F. and Pope, J. (1999), ‘The Global Coalition Against Corruption’, p. 267. 247 Quoted in Celarier, M. (1996), ‘Corruption: the Search for the Smoking Gun’, Euromoney, p. 37. 248 Quoted in Brummer, A. (1999), ‘The People’s Plutocrat’, The Guardian (London), 12 June, p. 6. 249 Brummer, A. (1999), ‘The People’s Plutocrat’, p. 6. processo privatizador, para la inversiOn extranjera y para la ayuda internacional al desarollo, como porque los neoliberales han hecho de la afinidad y mutua apetencia entre Estado omnipotente y corrupciOn un eficaz instrumento de propaganda sobre la necesidad de reducir el tamatio del estado. (Espinosa, p. 82; cited in Galtung and Pope, note 13, p. 280) Roughly translated, Espinosa says that TI is ‘the legitimate daughter of the neoliberal father and modernization mother, so much because transparency is a condition of credibility for the privatization process, for external influence and for international aid for development; also because the neoliberals have made an affinity and mutual link between the omnipotent State and corruption an efficient instrument of propaganda about the necessity to reduce the size of the state’. Galtung and Pope offer no further analysis on this quite stark observation on Espinosa’s part.

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  1. International Development Department, University of Birmingham, UK

    Heather Marquette

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© 2003 Heather Marquette

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Marquette, H. (2003). The Path to the World Bank’s Anti-Corruption Programme, 1981–1997. In: Corruption, Politics and Development. International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403943736_3

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