Institutional Investor Preferences

  • Mary Ann Haley
Part of the International Political Economy Series book series (IPES)


If we agree that concentration and coordination exists among emerging market’s institutional investors as discussed in prior chapters, then the preferences and actions of these institutional investors, as they influence the financial markets and politics in developing countries, are important to understand. In this chapter, institutional investors’ devaluation of democracy and preference for stability is explored. In particular, this chapter scrutinizes some of the top emerging market fund managers’ opinions about politics in developing countries. What emerges from a survey of various sources of information on emerging market investing is the finance community’s indifference and occasional disdain for democracy as they voice their preferences for neo-liberal reform and stability over most other concerns.1 This chapter will also discuss whether the preference for stability through authoritarianism might be correct in terms of its ability to achieve the economic results sought by investors. In other words, are investors wise to opt for stability at the possible cost of decreasing political liberalization?


Foreign Direct Investment Institutional Investor Economic Reform Fund Manager Political Stability 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Copyright information

© Mary Ann Haley 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mary Ann Haley
    • 1
  1. 1.Fairfield UniversityUSA

Personalised recommendations