Electoral Systems and Post-Communist Transition

Abstract

A significant body of empirical theory has been developed over the past forty years to explain the effects of electoral laws on the party systems of established democracies, most of which have historically been located in Western Europe.¹ Research has also been undertaken on the comparative study of electoral regulations such as nomination procedures and campaign financing.² Yet it is not obvious that the effects of given electoral institutions in established democracies will be those they have during the introduction of competitive politics. Newly competitive political systems can be expected to be particularly susceptible to the influence of institutional design, especially when democratization involves the establishment of new party systems. The electoral regime affects democratic performance by influencing popular perceptions of the political process, by shaping the party system, and by determining the composition of governing organs. The way electoral institutions are designed can be expected to have a decisive influence on the success of political reform because they are among the principal institutional structures that mediate between popular demands and policy outcomes.