Abstract
The conclusion of the Belfast Agreement in 1998 has undoubtedly been the climax of British policy in Northern Ireland. The political continuity of the peace accord was immediately acknowledged, most notably by a Nationalist MP, who described it as ‘Sunningdale for slow learners’.1 Arguably, with the Belfast agreement, the British government has finally achieved its political objective, yet it still remains to be seen whether it can provide the structures — and the political logic — necessary for the fulfilment of London’s long-term aspiration, that is, the containment of the Northern Ireland conflict.
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Notes
Seamus Mallon, quoted in J. Tonge, Northern Ireland. Conflict and Change, 2nd edition (Harlow 2000), p. 185; for some differences between 1974 and 1998, see P.R. Neumann, ‘Why 1974 was different’, Belfast Telegraph, 23 April 2001.
Accordingly, Mayhew rejected a motion at the 1994 Conservative Party conference which called for the British government to assume the role of ‘persuader for the Union’, stating that ‘we are persuaders for the future of Northern Ireland to be decided by the people of Northern Ireland without external impediment’; see P. Wintour, ‘Union persuader role is rejected’, The Guardian, 14 October 1994.
Bew, Northern Ireland: A Chronology, pp. 276–8.
Lord Mayhew (Patrick Mayhew), interview with author, 7 March 2002.
The various drafts as well as the document that was presented to the British government in June 1993 are reproduced in Mallie, The Fight, pp. 411–20.
‘Prime Minister: Joint Declaration issued by Prime Minister Rt Hon John Major MP and Taoiseach Albert Reynolds TD’, Cmnd. 2442 (London 1994).
‘A New Framework of Agreement’ is the second of the so-called Frameworks documents, contained in ‘Frameworks for the Future’, Cmnd. 2964 (London 1995), pp. 15–24.
This is presumably the reason why Sinn Fein welcomed it; see “Peace deal first, then weapons”’, The Independent, 27 February 1995.
‘British minister’, quoted in ‘Unionists out on a limb’, The Guardian, 23 February 1995.
‘Strand 2 Discussions’, Multi-Party Talks, January 1998.
For a reproduction of the document, see Cox, A Farewell, pp. 344–5.
T. Hennessy, The Northern Ireland Peace Process: Ending the Troubles? (London 2000), p. 163.
‘The Belfast Agreement: agreement reached in multi-party negotiations’, Cmnd. 3883 (London 1998), pp. 11–16, 25, 29.
D. McKittrick, C. Brown, ‘Brooke hints at talks with Sinn Fein’, The Independent, 4 November 1989.
‘°IRA defeated” says security minister’, The Independent, 26 August 1993.
Sir John Wheeler, interview with author, 18 February 2002.
Major, quoted in O. Boycott, M. White, ‘Major says troops strengths are not negotiable’, The Guardian, 22 November 1993.
See, for example, P. Whelan, ‘Nationalist unity against Britain’s military agenda’, An Phoblacht/Republican News, 4 December 1997.
This is what Sinn Fein’s own records show; see Sinn Fein, Setting the Record Straight (Dublin 1994), p. 30.
‘Security Service could have finished the IRA’, BBC News, 26 August 1997; http://www.bbc.co.uk/politics97/news/08/0826/secret.shtml
HC, Vol. 227, c.469, 24 June 1993; O. Boycott, ‘RUC may call supergrass scheme back’, The Guardian, 9 September 1993.
See D. Sharrock, ‘RUC chief confident IRA on road to peace’, The Guardian, 25 May 1995.
D. Sharrock, ‘Army reduced RUC support’, The Guardian, 18 October 1994.
See, for example, J. Hibbs, T. Harnden, R. Savill, ‘Bomb fury isolates Sinn Fein’, Daily Telegraph, 17 June 1996.
This is what Mayhew told the Labour MP Clive Soley in 1994; Soley’s diaries are quoted in J. Langdon, Mo Mowlam (London 2000), p. 273.
London’s version of events, starting with the message in February 1993, can be found in HC, Vol. 233, cc.785–7, 29 November 1993. The Republicans’ account was published by Sinn Fein, see Sinn Fein, Setting the Record Straight (Dublin 1994).
E. Delaney, An Accidental Diplomat: My Years in the Irish Foreign Service, 1987–1995 (Dublin 2001), pp. 320–2.
See D. Sharrock, ‘PM “broke word on Ulster talks”’, The Guardian, 21 June 1995.
P. Bew, G. Gillepsie, The Northern Ireland Peace Process, 1993–1996: A Chronology (London 1996), p. 35.
For the full text of the statement, see O. Boycott, ‘Sinn Fein told no further playing for time’, The Guardian, 20 May 1994.
See K.E. Schulze, M.L.R. Smith, Dilemmas of Decommissioning (London 1999), pp. 17–35.
Butler states Dublin and London were ‘at one in this respect at the time of the [JDP]’; see Lord Butler, interview with author, 6 March 2002.
Mayhew, quoted in D. Sharrock, ‘Mayhew tempers gun surrender call’, The Guardian, 18 October 1995.
‘Speech by the Prime Minister at the Royal Ulster Agricultural Show Belfast’, speech by Prime Minister Tony Blair, 16 May 1997; http://www2.nio.gov. uk/speeches.htm
‘Liaison Sub-Committee on Confidence Building Measures: Economic and social development: further paper by the British government’, Multi-party talks, 13 January 1998.
See, for example, O. Boycott, ‘Sectarian job gap closing in Ulster’, The Guardian, 26 June 1993.
T. Harnden, ‘Ulster Catholics getting more jobs’, Daily Telegraph, 28 June 1997.
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© 2003 Peter R. Neumann
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Neumann, P.R. (2003). The War is Over? Success and Failure of British Strategy, 1989–98. In: Britain’s Long War. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403938732_7
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