Abstract
So far, we have not modeled the political issues raised by pension systems. (Chapter 12 was only a naive attempt at modeling the interaction between government and the individual, while Appendix A is normative rather than descriptive.) There are plenty of papers on the political issues raised by pension systems and especially by pension reforms. Muller (1999) and Orenstein (2000) provide a rich qualitative analysis in the context of pension reforms in ex-socialist countries. In this chapter we shall sketch a model by Casamatta et al. (2000) on the relationship between democracy and pension systems, but first we outline the median voter model (for a simple introduction, see Stiglitz, 1988, Chapter 6).
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© 2003 András Simonovits
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Simonovits, A. (2003). Political models. In: Modeling Pension Systems. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403938459_18
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403938459_18
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-51217-1
Online ISBN: 978-1-4039-3845-9
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