Abstract
Much attention has been paid recently to the notions of social cohesion and ‘social capital’. This is happening in the context of the re-definition of the respective roles of the state and the voluntary or ‘third sector’. From a neo-liberal perspective, a sharing of social responsibilities between the public and the private sectors contributes to global competitiveness. But is this likely to happen if homo economicus is fundamentally selfish? As I explain below, economists are re-assessing the economic significance of altruism and gift-giving. Pure altruism still remains something of a mystery to them, but partial altruism can be instrumental in the production of public goods, thereby justifying a reduced role for the state. Yet one must be prepared to ask questions about the extent to which reciprocity and philanthropy can offer efficient as well as just solutions to the challenge of global competitiveness.
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Notes
1 Maori proverb cited by M. Mauss, The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange inArchaic Societies, I. Cunnison transl. (London: Cohen & West, 1969 [1925]), p. 69.
2 These were E.Y. Edgeworth’s exact words, see his Mathematical Psychics(London: Kegan Paul, 1881), p. 16.
3 On the importance of norms in the way in which social actors perceive, andrelate to, the world, see P. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, transl.R. Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
4 As Natan Sznaider notes, this is a relatively modern development; seeN. Sznaider, The Compassionate Temperament (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000).
5 J. Elster, ‘Social Norms and Economic Theory’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3, no. 4 (1989) 99.
7 See K. Monroe, ‘A Fat Lady in a Corset: Altruism and Social Theory’, AmericanPolitical Science Review, 38, no. 4 (1994) 862.
8 This is the way in which C. Arnsperger (in ‘Gift-Giving and Altruism: Deconstructingand Reconstructing the Rationale for Individual Optimization’.DOCH # 46 [1998], Chaire d’éthique économique et sociale, UniversitéCatholique de Louvain) reads Emmanuel Levinas who relates altruism toa radical orientation toward ‘otherness’, see E. Levinas, Otherwise than Being:Or Beyond the Essence. A. Lingis transl. (Boston: Martin Nijhoff, 1981 [1974]).
9 Kirsten Monroe reports that individuals who reminisced these troubled timesfelt as if ‘they had no choice’ but to act; see K. Monroe, ‘Altruism and theTheory of Rational Action: Rescuers of Jews in Nazi-Europe’, Ethics, 101(1990) 103–22.
10 One of the most objectionable aspects of a deontological approach is that itdownplays morally positive self-centred achievements. Morritz Schlick andHenry Hazlitt have written on this prejudice against pleasure which is rootedin ordinary views about moral behaviour as something that has to be ascetic;see L.B. Yeager, Ethics as Social Science: The Moral Philosophy of Social Cooperation(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2001), p. 85.
11 On the complexity of the self, see G.H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society from theStandpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934);J. Elster (ed.), The Multiple Self (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985);S.C. Kolm, Le bonheur-liberté: Bouddhisme profond et modernité (Paris: P.U.F., 1985); C. Taylor, Sources of the Self (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
12 See T. Lunati, Ethical Issues in Economics (London: Macmillan, 1997), Chapter 2.
13 See also Monroe, ‘A Fat Lady in a Corset’.
14 On this point, see also P.J. Hammond, ‘Altruism’, The New Palgrave: A Dictionaryof Economics, 1 (London: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 857.
15 See M. Rabin, ‘Incorporating Fairness Into Game Theory and Economics’,American Economic Review, 83 (1993) 1281–302; and C. Meidinger, ‘Equity,Fairness Equilibria and Coordination in the Ultimatum Game’, inL.-A. Gérard-Varet et al. (eds), The Economics of Reciprocity, Giving and Altruism(London: Macmillan, 2000).
16 Monroe, ‘A Fat Lady in a Corset’, pp. 870–83; in this paper, Monroe reliesheavily on Chapter 3 of H. Margolis’, Selfishness, Altruism and Rationality(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); for an other example of theimpact of socio-biology on economics, see P.A. Samuelson, ‘Altruism asa Problem Involving Group Selection in Economics and Biology’, AmericanEconomic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 83, no. 2 (1993) 143–8.
17 Elster, ‘Social Norms and Economic Theory’, p. 115.
18 ‘The essential problem is to provide a model of choice capable of accountingfor the observation that people make contributions to what they perceive asthe public interest.. .in contexts where the return to the individual appearsinconsequential’, Margolis, Selfishness, Altruism and Rationality, 1.
19 R. Sugden, ‘Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods Through VoluntaryContributions’, The Economic Journal, 94 (1984) 775. The notion of commitmentwas first proposed by Sen in his ‘Rational Fools’.
20 S. Kolm, ‘Altruism and Efficiency’, Ethics, 94 (1983) 18–95.
21 See S. Kolm, ‘The Logic of Good Social Relations’, Annals of Public and CooperativeEconomics, 71, no. 2 (2000) 171–89.
22 S. Kolm, ‘Introduction: The Economics of Reciprocity, Giving, and Altruism’,in Gérard-Varet et al. (eds), The Economics of Reciprocity, Giving andAltruism, p. 3.
24 One must distinguish the use of money in modern societies (or even premodernempires) from shell money and other instruments of exchangeavailable in a variety of tribal settings; while in the former gold or silver havebeen used to purchase almost anything, in the latter complex rules dictatewhat kind of valued shells can be used for specific purposes (funeral rites,weddings and so on).
25 The rival nature of these ‘gifts’ is evident in the fact that, on occasion, theyconsisted of the ostentatious destruction of certain valued objects likeemblazoned coppers.
26 Mauss, The Gift, pp. 63–81.
27 See A. Caillé, Don, intérêt et désintéressement (Paris: La Découverte, 1994);J. Godbout, L’esprit du don (Paris: La Découverte, 1992), and ‘Notes pourdéfendre le futur paradigme du don’, Transdisciplines, 1 (1997) 109–15;S. Kolm, La bonne économie: La réciprocité générale (Paris: P.U.F., 1984). Kolm isless directly influenced by Mauss than the other authors cited here.
28 The point is well argued by C. Arnsperger in his ‘Pratique du don et habitusnon contextuel: Comment (ne pas) se leurrer sur Mauss’, DOCH 41 (March1998), Chaire d’éthique économique et sociale, Université Catholique deLouvain.
29 See R. Kranton, ‘Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System’, AmericanEconomic Review, 86, no. 4 (1996) 830–51.
30 On some of the excesses of the patrimonial patterns of decision-making inAfrica, see L.C. Phillips, ‘The Political Economy of Policy Making in Africa’,African Economic Policy, Discussion paper no. 4 (May 1999) EAGER project,http://www.eagerproject.com/discussion4.shtml
31 See J.P. Thomas and T. Worrall, ‘Gift-Giving, Quasi-Credit and Reciprocity’,Department of Economics, University of St Andrews, unpublished manuscript(February 2000).
32 While Kranton argues that the trend is toward achieving greater efficiency byswitching to anonymous market transactions, in some cases (Egypt), thenetworks to which individuals and their families belong may be so efficient –market transactions; see Kranton, ‘Reciprocal Exchange’.
34 Van de Ven, ‘The Economics of the Gift’, CentER Discussion paper 2000–68,Tilburg University http://greywww.kub.nl:2080/greyfiles/center/2000/68.html
35 The warm-glow factor explains why people would want to make expensivebut functionally inadequate gifts: the receiver’s marginal utility remainsalmost the same and, therefore, he or she may not have the resources necessaryto match the gift, thereby leaving the giver in the advantageous positionof appearing to be more generous.
39 Even in Russia where private charities are a new phenomenon and havereceived most of their funding from western sources until now, rich businesspeople are beginning to make significant contributions. See ‘Europe: GoodWorks’, The Economist (24 March 2001) 61–2.
40 F. Passy, ‘Political Altruism and the Solidarity Movement’, in Giugni andPassy (eds), Political Altruism?, p. 13.
41 See R. Barbrook, ‘The Hi-Tech Gift Economy’, First Monday, 3, no. 12 (1998)http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue3_12/barbrook/index.html
42 R. Dahrendorf, ‘A precarious Balance: Economic Opportunity, Civil Society,and Political Liberty’, The Responsive Community: Rights and Responsibilities, 5,no. 3 (1995) 23.
43 See his Compassionate Conservatism: What it is, What it Does, and How it CanTransform America (New York: Free Press, 2000).
44 F. Fukuyama, ‘Social Capital and Civil Society’, paper presented to the IMFConference on Second Generation Reforms
45 I. Silber, ‘Modern Philanthropy: Reassessing the Viability of a MaussianPerspective’, in W. James and N.J. Allen (eds), Marcel Mauss: A Centenary Tribute(New York: Berghan Books), p. 134.
47 J. Jensen, Mapping Social Cohesion: The State of Canadian Research (Ottawa:Canadian Policy Research Networks, 1998), p. 3.
48 See A. Okun, Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff (Washington, DC: BrookingsInstitution, 1975).
49 This literature is conveniently summarized and discussed in J. Dayton-Johnson, Social Cohesion and Economic Prosperity (Toronto: Lorimer, 2001). Seealso F. Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (NewYork: Free Press, 1995).
50 The central importance of trust has been insistently underlined by F. Fukuyamain ibid., and The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of SocialOrder (New York: Free Press, 1999).
51 See E.C. Ladd, The Ladd Report (New York: Free Press, 1999).
52 See H. Mendras, ‘Le lien social en Amérique et en Europe’, Revue de l’OFCE, 76(January 2001) 179–87.
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Dobuzinskis, L. (2003). Social Norms in Transition: Gift-giving and Reciprocity in the Global Era. In: Busumtwi-Sam, J., Dobuzinskis, L. (eds) Turbulence and New Directions in Global Political Economy. International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403918451_7
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