Abstract
The constitution of the Republic of India declares it to be a secular state. But secularism in India has its own special meaning in the context of a country which has many religions and where the passion of religious sentiments affects political life. Religious concerns have, therefore, often affected state policy despite what one might assume would be secularism’s constraints on the role of religion. The study of the impact of religion on a formally secular state would be interesting in itself. Some argue that greater account of the deeply felt religious sentiments of people should be taken than has been possible within the somewhat abstract and idealistic framework of the secular constitution. Something of a movement has gathered pace amongst Indian intellectuals in this regard.1 They are mostly careful to distinguish their position from that of Hindu nationalists. I implicitly do not intend here to examine either their nuanced academic views or their relationship to the more strident and expressly political views and actions of the Hindu nationalists. Instead, I want to concentrate on the political parties and extraparliamentary organizations which have carved out a space in the Indian polity for an aggressive religion-based nationalism which calls into question, in a very real and immediate way, the secular basis of the Indian political system.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
Times of India (New Delhi), 8 April 1977. The Peking Review of the same day obviously did not pick this up.
Joint Communique, Soviet Review, 14, 21-2 May 1977, pp. 14-18.
International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1996/97, Oxford University Press, Oxford, for IISS, 1997.
Party official quoted in ‘The Nuclear Risk Shifts to South Asia’, The New York Times, 31 January 1993. In an earlier version of this chapter, written before the tests, I wrote: ‘One can only assume that this is mere nationalist rhetoric, because if the BJP is to be a serious party of government, then it must surely recognise the disbenefits of this strategy.’ I was in good company. Amitabh Matto argued that domestic and economic concerns would not permit testing even under the BJP (Mattoo 1996). D. J. Karl stated, ‘there is no indication that [India’s] nuclear weapons programme will be significantly expanded in the future, even if the hawkish BJP comes to power’; Karl 1997, p. 206. The CIA’s failure to spot the tests became infamous in the aftermath; we will look at that later in the context of relations with the US.
As K. Subramanyam, founding director of the (Indian) Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis once remarked on the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) which would freeze the situation in which only the five current and declared nuclear powers would have nuclear weapons, ‘I find our politicians are more interested in not signing the NPT than in the Pakistani threat.’ Quoted in McDonald 1992.
National Executive of the BJP, Resolution, Jaipur, February 1991, BJP Pamphlet 111, p. 23.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2000 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Ram-Prasad, C. (2000). Hindu Nationalism and the International Relations of India. In: Dark, K.R. (eds) Religion and International Relations. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403916594_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403916594_7
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-27846-6
Online ISBN: 978-1-4039-1659-4
eBook Packages: Palgrave Political & Intern. Studies CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)