Waging Limited Conflict: The Impact of the Korean War on Anglo-American Relations, 1950–1953

Abstract

The Korean war was an important watershed in Anglo-American relations. It marked the point where the Cold War developed into a ‘hot’ war, if one that was restricted to one part of East Asia.¹ In the course of the conflict the United States accepted full responsibility for containing communism, a development sought by Great Britain since 1946: Britain thought primarily in terms of an American commitment to defend Europe against the Soviet Union rather than American action in Asia; thus when the Korean War began in 1950 the possibility of the United States focusing more heavily on Asia rather than Europe could be discerned. In June–July 1950 President Harry Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson were most anxious to secure a British commitment in Korea.² American policy moved swiftly and successfully to seize the initiative in the United Nations (UN) following the initial North Korean advance towards South Korea, a development facilitated by the continued absence of the Soviet Union from the UN Security Council.³ UN condemnation of North Korea and approval of military action necessitated the participation of as many states as possible, so as to obviate the perception that the UN was a convenient facade for American policy. Clearly Britain had declined as a power but Britain was still significant in a way that had ceased to obtain by the time the Korean war ended in July 1953.