Cinderella of the Services

Abstract

The Admiralty’s attitude towards amphibious warfare was a reflection of the teaching and experience of the Royal Navy. The Navy’s wartime experience of amphibious operations was largely that of acting in support of the Army in order to initiate or support a land campaign. The specialist craft and equipment needed to conduct such operations drew men and resources away from the fleet, and the requirement to provide naval support for amphibious assaults diverted scarce shipping away from other important duties. Amphibious warfare had done little to promote the war at sea in the European theatre and was accepted by the Navy more as an onerous duty than an opportunity to be exploited. In the immediate postwar years Britain’s precarious financial position dictated the need for strict economy and this was reflected in a series of cuts in defence spending. In this environment the Admiralty was forced to concentrate resources on what it considered to be top priority projects. Highest priority was given to the core task of providing the equipment required to maintain control of the sea lanes in a future battle of the Atlantic. This was dictated by recent experience and established theory. The inter-service requirements of amphibious warfare were accorded a low priority and suffered accordingly.