Amphibious Renaissance

Abstract

Amphibious operations did not play a large part in the Allied victory in the First World War. They were to be central to victory in the Second. The first amphibious operation in the earlier conflict, the landing of British and Indian troops at Tanga in German East Africa in November 1914, was a hopeless fiasco that reflected well on none of the participants.¹ The only major amphibious operation of the war, the assault on the Gallipoli peninsula in 1915, failed to break through the Turkish defences and became stalemated close to the shore. Only with the Zeebrugge raid of April 1918 did amphibious operations achieve a measure of success, although even that operation failed in its aim to close the use of the port to enemy submarines. In the Second World War Britain and the United States developed a powerful amphibious capability which they employed successfully in Europe and the Pacific. New ships and craft were produced and techniques were developed which allowed assaulting forces to overcome even the most entrenched opposition. By 1945 amphibious warfare had provided the western Allies with a major strategic weapon, offering the ability to land a modern army on an enemy coastline and to support it in an offensive land campaign.