Introduction

Abstract

Current British maritime doctrine defines an amphibious operation as ‘an operation launched from the sea onto the land by naval and landing forces’. It identifies four particular types of operation: assault, raid, demonstration and withdrawal.¹ This definition is not significantly different from that which applied in the 1940s and 1950s, when an amphibious operation was defined as a landing or embarkation involving the integration of sea and land forces.² One of the most significant developments in British defence policy at the end of the twentieth century and the start of the twenty-first has been the increased emphasis placed upon amphibious capabilities as part of a joint expeditionary strategy designed to support British interests in Europe and beyond. The reassessment of strategic priorities that has occurred since the end of the Cold War has placed a renewed emphasis on expeditionary warfare and on the utility of amphibious forces across the spectrum of conflict. These developments pre-date the Labour government’s Strategic Defence Review of 1998 which confirmed and reinforced the process.