Abstract
The preceding chapter considered the period of occupation of Japan by US forces and the conservative backlash that followed it, arguing that through what amounted to a ‘passive revolution’ a new historic bloc was forged from the broken structure of the old, based not upon militarism but on economism and ‘pacifism’.1 This set the scene for the advent of what has become known as the ‘era of high speed economic growth’. Since the concern in this book is with the formation of this historic bloc and its fracturing (if not destruction) from the 1970s onwards, it is not necessary here to explore the period of high speed growth in any detail. It is the response to the appearance of these fractures by the existing Japanese hegemonic class and the attendant impacts upon Japanese and other East Asian societies (and, subsequently, on the world order), that forms the central focus of this study. As we shall see in the final part of the book, these impacts are clearly manifest, within and beyond Japan, in each of the four structures of power — production, finance, security and knowledge — previously identified as key areas of human activity. Before proceeding to that analysis, it is the task of this chapter to briefly outline the changing circumstances of the existing Japanese historic bloc as it began to feel the strain of domestic and international pressures for change, and to detail the efforts of the Japanese hegemonic class to hold the bloc together.
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Notes
For excellent analyses, see W. Tabb, The Postwar Japanese System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995)
K. Sheridan, Governing the Japanese Economy (Cambridge: Polity, 1993).
See M. Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945–1995 (London: Routledge, 1996)
See S. Sudo, The Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992).
J. Glaubitz, Between Tokyo and Moscow (London: Hurst & Company, 1995).
See S. Sudo, The Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992).
See P. Drucker, ‘The End of Japan, Inc.? An Economic Monolith Fractures’, Foreign Affairs, 72, 2 (1993) 10–15;
T. J. Pempel, Regime Shift: Comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political Economy (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998).
Moore, ‘Democracy and Capitalism’, pp. 382–3. According to Itoh, approximately 23 000 Japanese people of working age die each year. M. Itoh, ‘Is the Japanese Economy in Crisis?’, Review of International Political Economy, 1 (1994) 46. Issues raised by adoption of ‘lean production’ techniques are discussed in Chapter 8.
According to an economist at the Shimizu construction company, following the first oil shock ‘Japanese contractors were literally forced to look outward by a sharp plunge in domestic orders, shrinking profits, a slump in home building, and a slash in government public work budgets’. Iwasaki, H., ‘Transnational Strategy’, in Hasegawa, F. and the Shimizu Group FS, Built by Japan (New York: Wiley, 1988), p. 82.
See M. Ishikawa, ‘New Heights, Louder Message: Abstensions in Japan’s National Elections, 1993–95’, in P. Jain and T. Inoguchi (eds), Japanese Politics Today (Melbourne: Macmillan Education Australia, 1997), pp. 30–44. In 1993 voter turnout for elections to the House of Representative was 67.26 per cent, the lowest in post-war history. In 1995, voter turnout for elections to the House of Councillors was 44.52 per cent, again the lowest in post-war history. Figures from the Ministry of Home Affairs, various years. It should be noted, however, that the figures do fluctuate in accordance with periods of economic boom and recession, and have plummeted since the bursting of the ‘bubble’ economy and the current recession this brought about.
See also I. Kearns, ‘The Recruit Scandal and Corruption in Japanese Life’, Corruption and Reform, 5 (1990) 63–70.
Ozawa is a reformer who, amongst other things, wants to see Japan pursuing a more active role on the world stage. See Ozawa I., Blueprint for a New Japan (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1994).
Note, however, Stockwin’s argument (in ‘Reforming Japanese Politics’) that Hosokawa and his successor, Murayama Tomiichi, did bring about and consolidate substantial changes in the electoral system, including the re-drawing of constituency boundaries and the move to a mixed voting system of first-past-the-post and proportional representation. See also R. Christensen, ‘The New Japanese Election System’, Pacific Affairs, 69 (1996) 49–70.
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© 2002 Dominic Kelly
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Kelly, D. (2002). 1960-Present: Fracture and Response. In: Japan and the Reconstruction of East Asia. International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403905307_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403905307_4
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