The Challenges of Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Control of Armed Forces: the Case of Lithuania

Abstract

The establishment of democratic control over the armed forces has never been a key issue in Lithuanian politics and there have been few studies of this area.¹ Civil—military relations in Lithuania since independence have generally been characterized by relatively weak organization within the military and a strong civilian presence managing the overall national defence system (encompassing the Ministry of National Defence, the Integrated Defence Staff, the Lithuanian armed forces and other related services). Democratic, and in particular civilian, control of the armed forces has been a central feature of Lithuanian civil—military relations. When Lithuania established its independence, the Supreme Council (the Lithuanian legislative body until 1992 when it was superseded by the present-day parliament, the Seimas) in theory exercised control over the Department of National Defence, which in turn controlled the military. In practice, this model did not function perfectly. The exact nature of civilian control of the military was often confused and civil—military relations were more complicated than this model suggested — a situation made worse by the absence of legislation and bureaucratic procedures relating to civil—military relations. However, from the beginning of 1994, when Lithuania officially declared its goal of joining NATO, significant reforms to civil—military relations were implemented.