Introduction to Part II

Abstract

Common to conventional theories in sociology, law and political science is the question of how order can come about in a system with no central authority (Verdross and Simma, 1984, pp. 14–18; Amato, 1985, pp. 1295–6). In other words we are confronted with some version or other of the well-known Hobbesian dogma that for order to exist there must be a hierarchical coercive structure to keep man in awe: ‘where there is no common power, there is no law’.¹ In disciplines such as international relations and legal theory there is a similar problem, namely whether one can conceive of a system where several authoritative orders rule at the same time and where competences are overlapping and perhaps even constantly changing. We have already seen that from an international relations point of view the anarchical structure of the international system and the parallel view of the state as a hierarchical body founded on coercion make overlapping or divided sovereignty close to incomprehensible. According to neorealist Waltz (1979), only two types of political structure are available: society can either be anarchically or hierarchically organised — there is no in-between. The same goes for the ‘softer’ version of realism: liberal intergovernmentalism. Here sovereignty can be pooled but not divided (Keohane and Hoffmann, 1991).