The Ideology of Choice: A Rationalist Account of Institutions

Abstract

The rational choice literature on institutions has gained such popularity among all branches of the social sciences in recent decades that this in itself calls for more in-depth reflection (see March and Olsen, 1989; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, pp. 1–31; Green and Shapiro, 1994, pp. 1–12). Part of the reason for this growth in popularity is no doubt that rational choice institutionalism provides an elegant theoretical framework based on a well-elaborated and strictly defined microfoundation borrowed from economics. As Green and Shapiro (1994, p. 3) put it: ‘What sets contemporary rational choice scholarship apart is the systematic manner in which propositions about the microfoundations of political behavior are derived. Rational institutionalism thus sets out to explain why, in many situations, self-maximising individuals confronted by scarce resources and competition may join together to solve common problems. This in spite of the fact that they may gain no short-term benefits from doing so and may have little chance of reaching formal agreements’ (Coase, 1937, 1960; Olson, 1965; Williamson, 1975; Keohane, 1984; Oye, 1986). As Mueller (1989, p. 9) puts it in reference to economics: ‘Probably the most important accomplishment of economics is to demonstrate that individuals with purely selfish motives can mutually benefit from exchange.’

The idea of intelligent choice is a central idea of modern ideology, and political institutions are dedicated to that vision of life. Consequently, activities within political institutions, and particularly decision activities, are part of a set of rituals by which a society assures itself that human existence is built around choice. Such rituals confirm that human institutions are manifestations of the intelligent control of human destiny through intentional action.

(March and Olsen, 1989, p. 50)

Traditionally, these two fields [economics and political science] have been separated by the types of question they ask, the assumptions they make about individual motivation, and the methodologies they employ. Political science has studied man’s behavior in the public arena, economics has studied man in the marketplace. Political science has often assumed that man pursues the public interest. Economics has assumed that all men pursue their private interests, and has modeled this behavior with a logic unique among the social sciences. But is this dichotomy valid? … Could political man and economic man be the same? In the field of public choice, it is assumed that they are.

(Mueller, 1989, p. 1)