Abstract
The problem of struggles over material possessions is analysed in more detail in this chapter. The addition of material wealth to the state of nature opens up the possibility that the strategies of individuals might go beyond simply stealing and not stealing. For example, since individuals are concerned with material wealth, it is natural to imagine that they will undertake wealth improving activities other than stealing. Production and guarding whatever is produced are obvious possibilities. Once these complications are allowed, a new set of questions emerges. These are related to Friedman's question, 'what would happen if there were no systematic restraints on theft?' (Friedman, 1973, p. 207). For example, would such a system be stable and produce orderly anarchy, as writers such as Taylor (1982) claim? If there is stability, at what level? If stability is at a sufficiently high level of production it might not be worthwhile extending the state to protect property. Alternatively, would it be characterized by most efforts going to piracy and little to production?
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© 2001 Alex Talbot Coram
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Coram, A.T. (2001). Struggles over Property with Stealing, Production and Guarding - Non-Co-operative Games. In: State, Anarchy and Collective Decisions. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403900838_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403900838_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-41829-9
Online ISBN: 978-1-4039-0083-8
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