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The Appeal of Moral Naturalism

  • Russell Blackford
Chapter
  • 172 Downloads

Abstract

This chapter focuses on the search for natural, non-subjective moral properties. If properties such as moral goodness and moral wrongness take this form, then claims involving the relevant moral terms can simply state empirical and objective facts. However, the arguments of moral naturalists cannot establish that goodness is a non-subjective property, or that such “thin” properties as moral wrongness actually exist. Some moral naturalists appeal to thick moral terms in an effort to combine naturalistic properties with objective moral authority, but this ploy also fails.

Keywords

analytic reduction empirical reduction G.E. Moore moral naturalism naturalistic fallacy Open Question Argument thick moral terms virtue ethics 

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Copyright information

© Russell Blackford 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Russell Blackford
    • 1
  1. 1.University of NewcastleAustralia

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