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Democratic and Professional Accountability

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Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government

Part of the book series: Executive Politics and Governance ((EXPOLGOV))

Abstract

Democratic accountability is often seen as an essential institutional underpinning for the prosperity of nations. Democracies with well-established mechanisms of electoral accountability provide more secure property rights (Clague et al., 1997), implement policies with a higher economic rate of return (Isham et al., 1997) and perform better in areas such as rule of law, bureaucratic quality and school enrolment, as well as provide minimal levels of corruption (Keefer, 2007). These dividends of democracy probably help us understand why it is also claimed that “democracy does cause growth” (Acemoglu et al., 2014, p. 1).

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Authors
  1. Carl Dahlström
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  2. Victor Lapuente
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Gothenburg, Sweden

    Carl Dahlström (Professor) & Lena Wängnerud (Professor) (Professor) &  (Professor)

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© 2015 Carl Dahlström and Victor Lapuente

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Dahlström, C., Lapuente, V. (2015). Democratic and Professional Accountability. In: Dahlström, C., Wängnerud, L. (eds) Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government. Executive Politics and Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137556288_9

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