Abstract
Paulson’s naive proposal — as evidenced by supervisory events in other countries, including Italy1 — poses in extreme form the question of the content and limits of central bank discretion.
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Notes
Johnson, H.G., “Should There Be an Independent Monetary Authority?”, in: Smith, W.L. and Teigen, R.L. (eds), Readings in Money, National Income and Stabilization Policy, Irwin, Homewood, 1965, p. 249.
Woolley, J.T., Monetary Politics: The Federal Reserve and the Politics of Monetary Policy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1984.
Kahn, R.F., “Memorandum of Evidence Submitted to the Radcliffe Committee” (1958), in: Id., Selected Essays on Employment and Growth, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1972.
Ciocca, P., Ricchi per sempre? Una storia economica d’Italia (1796–2005), Bollati Boringhieri, Turin 2007.
Gerard Caprio and Daniela Klingebiel “Bank Insolvencies: Cross-Country Experience”, Policy Research Working Paper no. 1620, Washington 1999.
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© 2015 Pierluigi Ciocca
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Ciocca, P. (2015). Discretion, not Arbitrariness. In: Stabilising Capitalism. Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137555519_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137555519_10
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