• Gregory W. Fuller


Financial markets and institutions play an essential role in economic life. They gather together idle savings and convert them into usable funds. We depend on financial markets to distribute these funds in a way that fuels growth, puts capital to its most productive use, guides businesses toward sound decisions, and helps us mitigate life’s inherent risks. As Nobel laureate in economics Robert C. Merton put it, “The core function of the financial system is to facilitate the allocation and deployment of economic resources, both spatially and across time, in an uncertain environment.”1 Finance, when it performs this core function well, is an indispensable tool for improving productivity and material well-being.


Balance Sheet Credit Default Swap Debt Security Collateralized Debt Obligation Bretton Wood System 
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© Gregory W. Fuller 2016

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