Abstract
The purpose of the previous chapter was to test the hypotheses put forward in chapters 2 through 6 using two difficult cases. Opportunistic autonomous development seeking behavior functioned perfectly for Armenia and St. Kitts and Nevis. It helped these states survive given threats inherent to systemic vulnerability. For Lebanon and Cambodia, however, the same described behavior ended in (and may have caused) civil war. This is because the positions of these weak states were deemed vital to the goals of great powers. Unlike Armenia and St. Kitts and Nevis, great powers saw the position of Lebanon and Cambodia as essential to their security. Since this was the case, great powers, because of competition within the international system, acted through their proxies, providing the circumstances necessary for their importance. Therefore, in this chapter, we focus on variations in the dependent variable: weak state behavior resulting in civil war rather than survival.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Copyright information
© 2015 Hanna Samir Kassab
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Kassab, H.S. (2015). Autonomy yet Civil War: Cases of Lebanon and Cambodia. In: Weak States in International Relations Theory. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137543899_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137543899_8
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, New York
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-58046-0
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-54389-9
eBook Packages: Palgrave Intern. Relations & Development CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)