Abstract
The People’s Republic of China has allocated a substantial amount of its foreign aid and investments to deal with the “Taiwan issue.” Specifically, China has given economic help to a host of developing countries in order to reduce Taipei’s formal diplomatic ties, diminish its status as a nation-state, isolate Taiwan from the international community, and compel Taiwan’s government to negotiate with China for the island’s reunification.
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Notes
For a synopsis of China’s views and policy toward Taiwan, see Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010), chapter 7.
Ibid. The more popular view is that the United States changed its position when Mao’s forces defeated Chiang Kai-shek’s armies and established the People’s Republic of China See John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the Peoples Republic of China (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), p. 50 for a discussion of this.
A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia: A Challenge to the United States (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), p. 77. Barnett says that fostering revolution throughout Asia, which some others said was his first objective, was a lower priority.
Kuo-kang Shao, Zhou Enlai and the Foundations of Chinese Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1966), pp. 180–81.
Samuel S. Kim, “Taiwan and the International System: The Challenge of Legitimation,” in Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson (eds.), Taiwan in World Affairs (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 149. Kim calls the context a zero-sum one.
Some writers suggest that Mao had other motives, mainly testing US-Taiwan relations. See Thomas E. Stolper, China, Taiwan and the Offshore Islands (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1985), p. 35. The author suggests that the United States was put in the awkward position of having to risk a costly and unpopular war without clear objectives or breaking with Chiang Kai-shek and sacrificing Nationalist troops on the islands. Carver notes that China was aware that Washington and Taipei were in the process of concluding a mutual defense treaty and China acted for that reason. See Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China, p. 47. A Chinese scholar notes that the recovery of Taiwan was too closely related to the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, calling it its “historical curse.” See
Wang Shuzhong, “The Post-War International System,” in Harish Kapur (ed.), As China Sees the World (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987), p. 36.
Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China’s Strategy in the Nuclear Era (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1962), pp. 17–18.
According to one author, China had two major motives in giving aid: competing with Taiwan and obtaining sources of raw materials. See Carol Lancaster, “Foreign Aid in the Twenty-First Century: What Purposes?” in Louis A. Picard, Robert Groelsema, and Terry F. Buss (eds.), Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy: Lessons for the Next Half Century (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2008), p. 47.
See Robert C. North, The Foreign Relations of China (North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press, 1978), p. 133. Also see Carver, Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China, p. 55.
According to one writer, Mao indicated a willingness to renounce the use of force to liberate Taiwan in exchange for Washington engaging in talks at the ministerial level with China. Carver, Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China, p. 55. Carver suggests China may have been willing to agree to the de facto separation of Taiwan from China. This view, however, is contradicted by the fact the Soviet Union called for the avoidance of hostilities in the Taiwan Strait area, no matter by whom—requiring China to pledge not to use military force against Taiwan. In any event, China refused. See John Gittings, The World and China: 1922–1972 (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), p. 199.
Mao may have calculated that improved Sino-American ties would undercut Chiang Kai-shek’s regime, which would “fall into China’s hands.” See George McT. Kahin, The Afro-Asian Conference (New York: Cornell University Press, 1956), pp. 28–29.
R. G. Boyd, Communist China’s Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 34.
James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Knopf, 1999). Also see
Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower (New York: Henry Holt, 2015), p. 85. The author argues that Mao was influenced by the advice of Chen Yi, one of his generals, to so act.
See John F. Copper, China Diplomacy: The Washington-Taipei-Beijing Triangle (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 31–39.
See David Bonavia, Deng (Hong Kong: Longman, 1989), p. 222. The author notes that Deng understood that the conflict over Taiwan might set back relations with the United States by ten years. Also, see
Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Decision-Making Regarding Taiwan,” in David M. Lampton (ed.), The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978–2000 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 289.
Thus, Beijing turned to less aggressive means of dealing with Taiwan— including giving more economic aid to underdeveloped nations to help Beijing in the diplomatic war against Taipei and in the fight for the UN seat. See Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Policy: Developments Afier Mao (New York: Praeger, 1986), pp. 98–99.
See Maria Hsia Chang, Return of the Dragon: China’s Wounded Nationalism (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001), chapter 9.
Yong Deng, China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 19.
Michael Yahuda, Towards the End of Isolationism: China’s Foreign Policy after Mao (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), p. 210. Another writer, a Chinese scholar, put it this way: “Any person or political group that maintains Chinese unification and territorial integrity wins the people’s support and the appreciation of historians. Any person or political group that tries to divide China, to surrender the territory of our motherland to others and, thus, to harm the integrity of our motherland, will be cast aside by the people and condemned from generation to generation.”
Liu Ji, “Making the Right Choices in Twenty-First Century Sino-American Relations,” in Suisheng Zhao (ed.), Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2004), p. 249.
See Ross Terrill, The New Chinese Empire and What It Means to the United States (New York: Basic Books, 2003), pp. 210–12.
Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007), p. 416.
Willem Van Kemenade, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Inc. (New York: Doubleday, 1997), p. 193.
Sheng Lijun, China’s Dilemma: The Taiwan Issue (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), p. 92.
For details on the talks and the significance of the agreements, see Hungdah Chiu, Koo-Wang Talks and the Prospect of Building Constructive and Stable Relations across the Taiwan Straits (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law, 1993).
Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations, p. 153; Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), p. 42.
Chih-cheng Lo, “New Leadership Team, New Approaches toward Taiwan?” in Tun-jen Cheng, Jacques deLisle, and Deborah Brown (eds.), China under Hu Jintao: Opportunities, Dangers and Dilemmas (Singapore: World Scientific, 2006), p. 255.
For details, see John F. Copper, Playing with Fire: The Looming War with China over Taiwan (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), chapters 1, 5 and 6.
John F. Copper, Taiwan’s 2000 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election: Consolidating Democracy and Creating a New Era of Politics (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law, 2000), pp. 40–41.
China adopted what some called a “wait and see” strategy. See Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Will Cross-Strait Tensions Ease?” China Brief, January 31, 2002 (online at Jamestown.com). Also see
Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, November-December 2003.
John F. Copper, “Taiwan in Gridlock: Thoughts on the Chen Shui-bian Administration’s First Eighteen Months,” in John F. Copper (ed.), Taiwan in Troubled Times: Essays on the Chen Shui-bian Presidency (Singapore: World Scientific, 2002), pp. 27–28.
Richard Bush, “Taiwan Faces China,” in David Shambaugh (ed.), Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), pp. 173–74.
See Jing Huang, “China’s Taiwan Policy: Past and Present,” in Uk Heo and Shale A. Horowitz (eds.), Conflict in Asia—Korea, China-Taiwan, and India-Pakistan (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), pp. 25–41.
David Mozingo, Chinese Policy toward Indonesia, 1949–1967 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976), pp. 90–92.
For the dates when China established diplomatic relations with African countries, see Bruce D. Larkin, China and Africa, 1949–1970: The Foreign Policy of the People’s Republic of China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 66–67. Formal relations were decided between China and Guinea in 1959, though ambassadors arrived in early 1960.
Bih-jaw Lin, “The Republic of China and Africa: A Case of Positive Adaptation,” in Yu San Wang (ed.), The Foreign Policy of the Republic of China on Taiwan: An Unorthodox Approach (New York: Praeger, 1990), p. 146.
Samuel S. Kim, China, the United Nations, and World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 102–3.
See Wei-chin Lee, “Taiwan’s Foreign Aid,” Asian Affairs, Spring 1993, p. 44. Taiwan’s foreign aid at first was agricultural products some of which was extra or leftover American aid.
For details, see Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China’s Strategy in the Nuclear Era (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1962), chapter 5.
By 1970, Taiwan had $624 million in foreign exchange reserves, which stabilized the exchange rate and established its creditworthiness throughout the world. See Ralph N. Clough, Island China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 79. Taiwan thereafter accumulated foreign exchange at a very rapid rate. By early 1994, Taiwan possessed 86.8 billion by early 1994 based on a high savings rate and a favorable foreign trade balance. See
Fredrick F. Chien, Opportunity and Challenge (Tempe: Arizona Historical Foundation, 1995), p. 164.
See Gary D. Rawnsley, Taiwan’s Informal Diplomacy and Propaganda (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 32. It is also worth noting that Taiwan’s constitution cites “the promotion of international cooperation and performing international duties” as national objectives. Finally, Taiwan was grateful for the large amount of aid it received from the United States between 1950 and 1965 (US$1.5 billion in economic and technical and 2.4 billion in military aid) which it, unlike most aid recipient countries, utilized very effectively and could pass on its experience to others.
See Lin Bih-jaw, “The Republic of China and Africa: A Case of Positive Adaptation,” in Wang Yu San (ed.), Foreign Policy of the Republic of China on Taiwan: An Unorthodox Approach (New York: Praeger, 1990), p. 152.
Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1989), p. 223.
David H. Shin and Joshua Eisenman, China and Africa: A Century of Engagement (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), p. 301.
Ian Taylor, “Taiwan’s Foreign Policy and Africa: The Limitations of Dollar Diplomacy,” Journal of Contemporary China, No. 30, 2002, p. 126.
Samuel S. Kim, “Taiwan and the International System: The Challenge of Legitimation,” in Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson (eds.), Taiwan in World Affairs (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 168.
Joshua Eisenman, “China’s Post-Cold War Strategy in Africa: Examining Beijing’s Methods and Objectives,” in Joshua Eisenman, Eric Heginbotham, and Derek Mitchell (eds.), China and the Developing World: Beijing’s Strategy for the Twenty-First Century (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2997), p. 37.
Gerald Chan, “Taiwan as an Emerging Foreign Aid Donor: Developments, Problems and Prospects,” Pacific Affairs, Spring 1997, pp. 51. Gambia reportedly received $30 million over three years, a considerable sum in view of its GDP was $45 million. See Taylor, “Taiwan’s Foreign Policy and Africa,” p. 130.
The Star, December 2, 1994, cited in Ian Taylor, China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 143.
Cris Alden, China in Africa (London: Zed Books, 2007), p. 33; Taylor, China and Africa, p. 143. Alden cites the former figure; Taylor cites the latter one.
Chen Jie, Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Edgar, 2002), p. 107.
Michael Field, “Tongan Princess Switches to China in the Name of God and Money,” (online at michaelfield.org/tongal.htm). The piece was written in January 1999.
See Alexander Casella, “Macedonia: Taiwan’s Lost Gambit,” Asia Times, July 11, 2001 (online at atimes.com).
For Zhu’s exact statement and the reaction in Taiwan, see John F. Copper, Taiwan’s 2000 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election: Consolidating Taiwan’s Democracy and Creating a New Era of Politics (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law, 2000).
T. Y. Wang, “Taiwan’s Bid for UN Membership,” in Edward Friedman (ed.), China’s Rise, Taiwan’s Dilemmas and International Peace (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 185.
Czeslaw Tubilewicz, “Taiwan’s Macedonian Project,’ 1999–2001,” China Quarterly, September 2004, p. 784.
Dennis V. Hickey, Foreign Policy Makingin Taiwan: From Principle to Pragmagism (London: Routldge, 2013), p. 15.
Craig S. Smith, “China Issues New Warning to Taiwan, Just in English,” New York Times, August 8, 2002 (online at query.nytimes.com). The amount of the aid pledge was not reported by China, but was confirmed in “Background Note: Nauru,” U.S. Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, October 2007 (online at state.gov). Another source puts the offer at $60 million in aid and $77 million in immediate debt relief. See
Anthony Van Fossen, “The Struggle for Recognition: Diplomatic Competition between China and Taiwan in Oceania,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2007, p. 135.
Chien-min Chao and Chih-chia Hsu, “China Isolates Taiwan,” in Edward Friedman (ed.), China’s Rise, Taiwan’s Dilemmas and International Peace (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 53.
See Richard C. Bush, Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Washingon, DC: Brookings, 2005), pp. 226–27 for further details. In May 2005, reportedly in return for Taiwan promising to bail out Air Nauru by paying the outstanding debt of $13.5 million on its only jet, Nauru re-recognized Taipei. See Van Fossen, “The Struggle for Recognition,” p. 136.
R. Evan Ellis, China in Latin America: The Whats & Wherefores (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009), p. 15.
Melody Chen, “Taiwan, Grenada Set to Cut Ties,” Taipei Times, January 27, 2005 (online at taipeitimes.com). The writer cites the paper The Grenada. Reportedly China’s aid to Grenada amounted to $1,500 per capita. See National Review, May 5, 2007, p. 10. Later it was reported in Taiwan that China promised Grenada $250 million at this time. See “Taiwan Accuses China of Buying Former Ally Senegal,” China Post, May 20, 2007, p. 1.
Caitlin Fitzsimmons, “A Troubled Frontier,” South China Morning Post, January 17, 2008, cited in
Stefan Halper, The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century (New York: Basic Books, 2010), p. 109.
C. Fred Bergsten, Bates Gill, Nicholas R. Lardy and Derek Mitchell, China: The Balance Sheet (New York: Public Affairs, 2006), p. 120.
Keith Bradsher, “Chad, Dumping Taiwan, Forges Link to China,” International Herald Tribune, August 8, 2006 (online at iht.com).
Keith Bradsher, “Chad’s Switch to Beijing’s Side Draws Angry Response in Taiwan,” New York Times, August 8, 2006 (online at nytimes.com).
Thomas Pearmain, “Chad Chooses China: Future of Chad’s Energy Sector Likely to Change Dramatically,” Global Insight Daily Analysis, August 9, 2006 (online at uofaaweb.ualberta.ca).
For details on this matter, see Peter Kien-hong Yu, The Second Long March: Struggling against the Chinese Communists under the Republic of China (Taiwan) Constitution (New York: Continuum, 2009), p. 126. Also see Cardenal and Araujo, China’s Silent Army, p. 249. According to the latter, China pledged $430 million: $30 million in cash, $300 million through buying Costa Rican bonds, $100 million in Chinese goods (including building a stadium).
Dave Kopel, “The Threat from Sino-America,” TSC Daily, July 16, 2007 (online at www.tscdailyl.com/article.aspx?id=071107E).
Ellis, China in Latin America, p. 217. It was reported elsewhere that China purchased only $150 million of $300 promised for the bonds at the time. See Jamil Anderlini, “Beijing Uses Foreign Reserves to Target Taiwan,” Financial Times, September 11, 2008 (online at ft.com). Also see 2008 Report to Congress, p. 52.
David Chang, “Why Tiny Nations Matter to Taiwan,” China Post, June 11, 2007, p. 2.
Ko Shu-ling, “Presidential Office Defends Aid Policy,” Taipei Times, August 24, 2007 (online at taipeitimes.com).
In May 2008, Foreign Minister Huang resigned under pressure amid talk of the Chen administration’s use of foreign aid, in particular its attempt to establish relations with Papua New Guinea using aid. See Jonathan Adams, “Taiwan Foreign Minister Resigns over Diplomatic Blunder,” International Herald Tribune, May 6, 2008 (online at iht.com).
Joe Hung, “Time to Stop Checkbook Diplomacy,” China Post, June 11, 2007, p. 2.
One writer even states that China’s rise and its “use of its new wealth and power to isolate Taiwan… the Republic of China might become legally nonexistent.” Chien-min Chao and Chih-chia Hsu, “China Isolates Taiwan,” in Edward Friedman (ed.), China’s Rise, Taiwan’s Dilemmas and International Peace (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 58.
See Bates Gill, Rising Star: China’s New Security Diplomacy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2007), pp. 142–43.
See Jenny W. Hsu, “Ties between Taiwan and Paraguay Still Strong: Ma,” Taipei Times, February 21, 2009, p. 3.
Xi Jinping, The Governance of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2014), pp. 260–65.
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Copper, J.F. (2016). Using Aid and Investment Diplomacy to Isolate Taiwan. In: China’s Foreign Aid and Investment Diplomacy, Volume II. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137532725_4
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