Epilogue

Abstract

Since the transition to democracy that South Korea experienced in 1987, constitutional justice has been prominently involved in the struggle opposing the state and parts of civil society over defining the boundaries of enmity. The various legal instruments delineating them by enforcing what counts as “national” or “antinational” in the post-authoritarian era have been repeatedly challenged before the Constitutional Court of Korea. In response, the court’s intervention has produced a duality of outcomes, both liberal and illiberal. This ambivalence is particularly striking when it comes to the repressive mechanisms inherited from the pre-1987 period, whose legality constitutional jurisprudence has strived to control while upholding their continued legitimacy to defend not only the state but also the basic order of free democracy. By shaping these tools in a way consistent with the procedural requisites of the rule of law, and by displacing the ground of their raison d’être, the court has contributed to consolidating their post-authoritarian relevance and functionality: policing a contentious and non-inclusive way of envisioning the national in the name of protecting national security.