Abstract
Since the start of the “Arab Spring” in late 2010, much has been written about the uprisings that swept through North Africa. However, the role of Amazigh1 militants in the demonstrations and their early support for popular contestation movements were barely acknowledged, despite the distinctive flags and banners used throughout the region.2 These symbols sought both to assert their separate identity and to challenge the narrative of the Arab Spring as a uniform phenomenon caused by similar circumstances in different states. In several countries, beyond the socioeconomial difficulties, the protests have revealed “cultural claims”3 from populations refusing assimilation to Arab culture. The Amazigh cultural movement has become increasingly influential and organized in the last decade, particularly with the development of the Internet, which has enabled it to become a truly transnational movement incorporating Amazigh minorities as well as the diaspora. This movement is difficult to define: it is composed of a multitude of cultural and (increasingly) political associations spread in various states and aiming at different goals. While some seek to promote the use of Amazigh languages and associated traditions, others have political ambitions and claim that Amazigh minorities are deprived of their basic constitutional rights.4 The former tend to keep strong links with the rural communities constituting the majority of Amazigh dialects speakers;5 the latter, on the contrary, are generally urban and educated, with ties to the international diaspora.
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Notes
See S. Smith. “Flying the Flag for North Africa’s ‘Berber Spring,’” BBC News. (2011). Accessed at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14650257.
M. Oiry-Varacca, “Le ‘Printemps arabe’ à l’épreuve des revendications amazighes au Maroc: Analyse des enjeux territoriaux et politiques des discours sur l’identité,” L’espace Politique (2012). Accessed online at: http://espacepolitique.revues.org/2504.
See D. Crawford and K. Hoffman, “Essentially Amazigh: Urban Berbers and the Global Village,” in The Arab-African and Islamic World: Interdisciplinary Studies, ed. K. Lacey (New York: Peter Lang, 2000), 124. Activists claim that Berber communities are denied access to education, health care, and other services because these services are provided in Arabic only.
K. Hoffman, We Share Walls: Language, Land and Gender in Berber Morocco (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 14.
M. Willis, “The Politics of Berber (Amazigh) Identity: Algeria and Morocco Compared,” in North Africa: Politics, Region and the Limits of Transformation, ed. Y. Zou-beir & H. Amirah-Fernandez (London: Routledge, 2008), 228.
See P. Vermeren, Maghreb, les origines de la révolution démocratique (Paris: Fayard/ Pluriel, 2011), 63.
See M. Elkouche, “The Question of the Amazigh Language and Culture in Morocco,” in Moroccan Culture in the 21st Century, ed. M Dellal and A Sellam (New York: Nova Publishers, 2013), 6.
According to social anthropologist Gellner, Berber minorities did not perceive themselves as part of a transnational communitiy. He wrote: “The Berber sees himself as a member of this or that tribe […] and not as a member of a linguistically defined ethnic group.” See, E Gellner, “Introduction” in Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa, ed. E Gellner and C Micaud (London: Duckworth, 1973), 13.
Quoted in S. Ben-Layashi, “Secularism in the Moroccan Amazigh Discourse,” The Journal of North African Studies 12, no. 2 (2007): 154–71, 158.
Quoted in B. Maddy-Weitzman, The Berber Identity Movement and Challenge to North African States (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011), 90.
Quoted in Maddy-Weitzman, “The Amazigh Factor: State-Movement Relations under Mohammed VI,” in Contemporary Morocco: State, Politics and Society under Mohammed VI, ed. B Maddy-Weitzman and D Zisenwine (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 112.
H. Roberts, “Co-opting Identity: The Manipulation of Berberism, the Frustration of Democratisation and the Generation of Violence in Algeria,” LSE: Crisis State Programme 6 (2001): 29.
P. Silverstein and D. Crawford, “Amazigh Activism and the Moroccan State,” Middle East Report 233 (2004): 44.
S. Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 181.
D. Merolla, “Digital Imagination and the ‘Landscapes of Group Identities’: The Flourishing of Theatre, Video and Amazigh Net’ in the Maghrib and Berber Diaspora,” The Journal of North African Studies 7, no.4 (2002): 122-31, 129.
S. Ben Nefissa, “Mobilisations et revolutions dans les pays de la Méditerranée arabe à l’heure de “l’hybridation” du politique,” Revue Tiers Monde 5 (2011):12.
H. Yezza, “Algeria: Bouteflika Strikes Back,” Open Democracy (2013). Accessed online at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/hicham-yezza/algeria-bouteflika-strikes-back.
G. Joffé, “North Africa’s Arab Spring Revisited.” in North Africa’s Arab Spring, ed. G Joffé (Abingdon: Taylor& Francis, 2013), 197.
See E. Gomez-Casado, P. Del Moral, J. Martinez-Laso, A. Garcia-Gomez, L. Allende, C. Silvera-Redondo, J. Longas, M. Gonzalez-Hevilla, M. Kandil, “HLA Genes in Arabic-Speaking Moroccans: Close Relatedness to Berbers and Iberians,” Tissue Antigens 55, no. 3 (2000): 239–49, which shows that there are no clear genetic differences between Arabic-speaking and Berber populations, suggesting that most Moroccans are in fact of Berber descent.
Quoted in I. Binoual, ‘Amazigh Activists Launch pan-Maghreb Body,’ Maghare-bia (2011). Accessed online at: http://magharebia.com/en_GB/articles/awi/features/2011/08/22/feature-02.
P. Silverstein, “The Pitfalls of Transnational Consciousness: Amazigh Activism as a Scalar Dilemma,” The Journal of North African Studies 18, no. 5 (2013): 768–78, 774
Quoted in M. Ferkal, “Libye: LAmazighité n’est pas à négocier!” Tamazgha.fr (2013).
See C. Stephen, “After Gaddafi, Libya Splits into Disparate Militia Zones,” The Guardian 2012. Accessed online at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/10/libya-split-between-militias.
B. Maddy-Weitzman, “The Limits and Potentials of Israeli-Maghreb Relations,” IPRIS Maghreb Review 4 (2010): 15.
M. Masbah, “The Amazigh in Morocco: Between the Internal and the External,” Doha Institute 1 (2011). Accessed online at: http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/b40ace5f-5491-4734-b7cf-0d05c6b7934d.
G. Bannerman, “The Key to Understanding the Arab Spring,’” Reuters, (2012). Accessed online at: http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2012/10/11/the-key-to-understanding-the-arab-spring/.
See R. Moussaoui, “Al’ombre des printemps arabes, le réveil des Berbères,” L’Humanité (2013).
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© 2015 Fawaz A. Gerges
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Jay, C. (2015). A Berber Spring: the Breakthrough of Amazigh Minorities in the Uprisings’ Aftermath. In: Gerges, F.A. (eds) Contentious Politics in the Middle East. Middle East Today. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137530868_14
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