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Achieving Coherence Between Macroeconomic and Development Objectives

  • Gerald Epstein
Part of the International Economic Association Series book series (IEA)

Abstract

In the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis of 2007–2008, the United States and Europe are stuck in a state of political paralysis that is leading to a new norm of fiscal austerity, high unemployment, and, in the case of Europe, economic stagnation. With fiscal policy orientated around austerity it is the central banks—the Federal Reserve (the Fed), the Bank of England (BOE) and the European Central Bank (ECB)—that remain the only macroeconomic authorities with the authority and political power to try to revive these struggling economies.

Keywords

Monetary Policy Central Bank International Monetary Fund Real Exchange Rate Federal Reserve 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Gerald Epstein 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gerald Epstein
    • 1
  1. 1.Political Economy Research Institute (PERI)University of Massachusetts AmherstUSA

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