Abstract
At the very end of the Cold War, the scenario of a major-power war had largely been dismissed by “end of history” and other variants of democratic- liberal theory. Fukuyama’s “end of history” arguments had been preceded by the obsolescence-of-war theories of Norman Angel, presented in The Great Illusion (1910), and updated by John Mueller among others, who argued that the expense of war preparations and the benefits of free trade, as well as the destruction and insanity of war itself, make major-power war largely unthinkable and even more so in the nuclear age.1
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Notes
John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War ( New York: Oxford University Press, 1987 ).
David W. Pike, ed., The Closing of the Second World War ( New York: Peter Lang, 2001 ).
Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy ( New York: Harper, 1975 )
Geoffrey Blainey, Causes of War, 3rd edition ( New York: Free Press, 1988 ).
Sean McMeekin, July 1914: Countdown to War (London: Basic, 2013), 390fn.
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© 2015 Hall Gardner
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Gardner, H. (2015). Why Major-Power War Is Still Possible, Though Not Inevitable!. In: Crimea, Global Rivalry, and the Vengeance of History. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137528179_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137528179_8
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, New York
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