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Conclusion

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Abstract

This book addresses political leadership behavior after the state is embroiled in war that has proven longer, costlier, and more difficult than expected at the outset. But it says nothing about why states have repeated ly found themselves in such circumstances. T he simplest answer may be, as Walt articulates, “Getting out of a quagmire is a whole lot harder than getting into one.”1 But to some extent, the phenomenon also stems from an arrogance of power and faith in technology that is often disabused only to be reborn at another time and in another form. After the rapid collapse of the Afghani Taliban in 2002, leading defense analysts were quick to proclaim the “Afghan Model” as a revolutionary new form of warfare that would allow the external power to rapidly achieve extensive military and political objectives on the cheap, thus mitigating the pitfalls of protracted armed conflict.2 Reflecting a hint of irony, the war in Afghanistan (2001-??) would become the longest in US history. Whatever the reason, states will likely continue to engage in the types of costly, protracted, and stalemated wars discussed throughout this book. And to the extent this occurs, political leaders will continue to struggle with the dilemma of “how to bring an end to the war without being blamed for how it ended.”3

Keywords

Political Leadership Political Trust Domestic Politics Military Leadership Leadership Change 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 2.
    Richard Andres, Craig Willis, and Thomas Griffith, “Winning with Allies: The Strategic Value of the Afghan Model,” International Security 30, no. 3 (2005/2006).Google Scholar
  2. 3.
    Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006–2008 (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 79.Google Scholar
  3. 4.
    See Elizabeth A. Stanley, Paths to Peace: Domestic Coalition Shifs, War Termination and the Korean War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 5.
    See Risa Brooks, Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008)Google Scholar
  5. Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic logic of Nonviolent Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. See also Bradley N. Nelson, “Regime Type and the Persistence of Costly Small Wars” (PhD dissertation, The Ohio State University, 2008).Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Stephen Van Evera, “Causes of War” (PhD dissertation, Unversity of California, Berkeley, 1984), 206–7.Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Douglas L. Wheeler, “The Military and the Portuguese Dictatorship, 1926–1974,” in Contemporary Portugal: The Revolution and Its Antecedents, ed. Lawrence S. Graham and Harry M. Makler (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), 191.Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Douglas Porch, The Portuguese Armed Forces and the Revolution, Hoover Institution Publication 188 (London: Croom Helm; Hoover Institution Press, 1977), 83.Google Scholar
  11. 21.
    Fred Charles Iklé, Every War Must End, Columbia Paperback (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 85.Google Scholar

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© Shawn T. Cochran 2016

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