Abstract
This chapter provides an account of G. W. F. Hegel’s treatment of judgment in the Science of Logic. I focus on what Hegel calls the judgment of reflection. The judgment of reflection is what Hegel refers to when he deals with the different quantifiers possible in the relation of the subject and the predicate in judgments. It is on the basis of Hegel’s metaphysical commitments that his discussion of quantity in judgment can be distinguished most clearly from Immanuel Kant’s. I will argue that these commitments are manifest in the assumptions, method, and standpoint in accordance with which Hegel’s Science of Logic unfolds.
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© 2015 Clayton Bohnet
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Bohnet, C. (2015). Truth and Judgment in Hegel’s Science of Logic . In: Logic and the Limits of Philosophy in Kant and Hegel. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137521750_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137521750_7
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-70562-7
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-52175-0
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