Conclusion

Abstract

Between Iraq’s revolution in 1958 and the end of the Kurdish War in 1975, the driving force behind US policy toward Iraq was America’s Cold War strategy. In one fell swoop, Iraq’s revolution upended America’s containment strategy and opened the country to superpower competition and intervention. Throughout the 1958–75 period, both superpowers intervened in Iraq’s domestic affairs in an effort to influence the direction of whatever regime was holding power in Baghdad. Consistently, America’s decisions and actions were based on the denial of Soviet Union influence over Iraq and the region. This is exemplified by the Eisenhower administration’s tentative collaboration with Nasser to prevent the communists from coming to power during the 1958–59 period; the Kennedy administration’s support for the first Ba’th regime during its brutal war against the Soviet-backed Kurds in 1963; the Johnson administration’s friendly relations toward the anticommunist, Arab nationalist Arif brothers; and the Nixon-Ford administrations’ backing of the Kurds in order to undermine the second Ba’th regime after it appeared to be pulling Iraq into the Soviet orbit. A pattern can therefore be established, where if a regime in Baghdad appeared to display pro-communist behavior, the United States would intervene in order to counter this threat, often relying on covert action. Likewise, if the Iraqi regime was viewed as potentially anticommunist, the United States adopted a policy of engagement, cultivated friendly relations, and sought to prevent communist or pro-Soviet forces from gaining influence. In each instance, the primary motivation for America’s interventions in Iraq was its perceived position in Cold War geopolitics. Alas, America’s competition with the Soviet Union over Iraq and the broader Middle East would contribute to Saddam Hussein’s rise to power and, ultimately, the destabilization of Iraqi politics today.