Skip to main content

Part of the book series: Middle East Today ((MIET))

  • 213 Accesses

Abstract

When Richard M. Nixon came to office in January 1969, he vowed to radically transform the way the United States conducted its foreign relations. To achieve this, Nixon found an intellectual soul mate in Henry Kissinger, a Harvard-educated professor of history and international relations, whom he named as his national security adviser. While Nixon and Kissinger had very different personalities, they shared the same basic assumptions about the conduction of foreign policy. A ruthless and cunning career politician, Nixon had always been willing to use any means available to achieve his objectives, characteristics that would eventually lead to his own demise. Nixon was a reclusive i ntel le c t , who d id not l i ke people, a nd w a s suspic iou s of a l l t hose w ho s u r rou nded him. However, despite his personal shortcomings, Nixon had a highly sophisticated understanding of international affairs. He considered himself a realist and made decisions on the basis of a cold calculation of how to maximize America’s national interests, even if this was at the expense of friends or allies. Kissinger, on the other hand, could not have been more different. Born in Germany to a Jewish family in 1923, Kissinger was a highly intellectual, gregarious socialite, who basked in the public limelight. However, he was also a staunch realist, who approached the foreign policy in a brutal, Machiavellian way, whereby practical and material considerations always trumped ideological notions, morals, or ethical premises.1 Privately, these two disliked each other. Nixon once commented, “I don’t trust Henry [Kissinger], but I can use him.” Likewise, Kissinger called Nixon an “egomaniac” who was “obsessed [with] the fear that he was not receiving adequate credit” for foreign policy decisions.2 These differences, however, did not prevent them from developing a successful working relationship, which helped guide the United States to a series of major foreign policy triumphs. This was because neither Nixon nor Kissinger would allow anything to stand in their way in achieving their objectives.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 109.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 139.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Authors

Copyright information

© 2015 Bryan R. Gibson

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Gibson, B.R. (2015). Nixon and the Second Ba’thist Regime: January 1969–July 1972. In: Sold Out? US Foreign Policy, Iraq, the Kurds, and the Cold War. Middle East Today. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137517159_6

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics