Privacy: A Personal Sphere, Not Home-Bound

  • Amitai Etzioni
Part of the Palgrave Macmillan’s Studies in Cybercrime and Cybersecurity book series (PSCYBER)


“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” So stated the Supreme Court majority in Katz v. United States1 in 1969. This chapter builds on this statement and attempts to show that it has generally gone unheeded in Fourth Amendment case law since 1969, and that sweeping and significant technological advances mean that the statement is more valuable than ever.


Public Space Legal Scholar Feminist Scholar Private Space Fourth Amendment 
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© Amitai Etzioni 2015

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  • Amitai Etzioni

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