Skip to main content

The Perpetual Search for Efficiency: The Canadian Approach to the RMA and Military Transformation

  • Chapter
Reassessing the Revolution in Military Affairs

Part of the book series: Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues and Policies ((ISSIP))

Abstract

Since 1945 Canadian defense policy has continuously been shaped by a set of interrelated deterministic variables: geography, alliances, the public favoring of social programs, and budgets.1 The country’s political, bureaucratic, and even military leadership, have long since sought ways to get more “bang for the defense buck” through the adoption of measures that ostensibly would generate greater efficiencies and efficacy in the Canadian Forces (CF) without undermining the military’s ability to fulfill North American and European alliance obligations. One such approach was the 1968 unification of the three armed services — navy, army, and air force — into one CF. Another effort, and the one being analyzed in this chapter, was the adoption of the concepts and platforms affiliated with the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and its close cousin, Transformation, particularly during the period of 200511, at the height of Canada’s combat operations in Afghanistan. But, as this chapter will emphasize, the CF’s approach to both the RMA and Transformation produced mixed results as plans were undermined by the deterministic constraints typical of defense policy-making in Canada, inter-service tensions found at the executive level within the CF, and, of course, the challenges and costs of combatting an insurgency in Afghanistan.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 89.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 119.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. Dan Middlemiss & Joel Sokolsky, “Canadian defence: decisions and determinants”, (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Canada, 1989) pp.121–22 &195.

    Google Scholar 

  2. R.L. Sutherland, “Canada’s long term strategic situation”, International Journal, 17.3 (1962) pp.99–201

    Google Scholar 

  3. Jeffrey F. Collins, “Reviving and revising the Canada First defence strategy”, C2C Journal, 8.3 (2014) pp.24–28

    Google Scholar 

  4. William L. Dowdy, “The Canadian navy: torpedoed again”, Armed Forces & Society, 16.1 (1989) p.111. The author makes a poignant remark on Canadian defense, Canadians “… prefer daycare over destroyers, and socialized medicine over submarines. But they can afford both, and maybe they cannot afford not to provide both.”

    Article  Google Scholar 

  5. David Perry, “A return to realism: Canadian defence policy after the great recession”, Defence Studies, 13:3 (2013) pp.340–42 & 344–45

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. Dan Middlemiss, “Defence procurement in Canada”, in David B Dewitt & David Leyton-Brown (eds.), “Canada’s International Security Policy”, (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1995) p.407

    Google Scholar 

  7. Andrew Richter, “Strategic ambitions and fiscal realities: give the navy priority”, Policy Options (April 2002) p.28

    Google Scholar 

  8. The abandonment of a Canadian indigenous jet fighter capability following the cancellation of the CF-105 “Arrow” in 1959 is a fascinating tale of Canada’s integration within the North American defense framework. Unfortunately it is outside the scope of this chapter. For more information see Donald C. Story and Russell Isinger, “The origins of the cancellation of Canada’s Avro CF-105 Arrow fighter program: a failure of strategy”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 30.6 (2007) pp.1025–50

    Article  Google Scholar 

  9. Tim Dunne, “A case for the F-35 Lightning”, Canadian Military Journal, 11.4 (2011) pp.55–60

    Google Scholar 

  10. Joel J. Sokolsky, “Canada, getting it right this time: the 1994 Defence White Paper”, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1995) pp.2–3

    Google Scholar 

  11. Sean Maloney, “Are we really just peacekeepers? The perception versus the reality of Canadian military involvement in the Iraq war”, IRPP Working Paper Series no. 2003-02 (2003) pp. 1–31

    Google Scholar 

  12. Sutherland, “Canada’s long term strategic situation”, p.220; Sokolsky, Canada, getting it right this time: the 1994 Defence White Paper, p.16; and Elinor Sloan, “The Revolution in Military Affairs: implications for Canada and NATO”, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002) p.129

    Google Scholar 

  13. Robert M. Farley, “Grounded: the case for abolishing the United States Air Force”, (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2014) pp.174–77; Sloan, The Revolution in Military Affairs: implications for Canada and NATO”, p.129.

    Google Scholar 

  14. Daniel Gosselin, “Hellyer’s ghosts: unification of the Canadian forces is 40 years old — part one”, Canadian Military Journal, 9.2 (2008) pp.6–15. A 1962 Royal Commission on Government Organization found that the military and the Department of National Defence were inefficient in their personnel and acquisition policies. This report became the driver for Defence Minister Hellyer’s unification reforms. Over the succeeding decades the three services eventually reasserted their identities by obtaining separate uniforms, environmental command structures (e.g. Mobile Command became Land Force), and their original names: RCN, the Canadian Army, and RCAF.

    Google Scholar 

  15. Andrew Richter, “Forty years of neglect, indifference, and apathy: the relentless decline of Canada’s Armed Forces”, in Patrick James, Nelson Michaud & Marc J. O’Reilly (eds.), “Handbook of Canadian Foreign Policy”, (Oxford: Lexington Books, 2006) pp.63–65

    Google Scholar 

  16. Department of National Defence, “Canadian Defence Policy”, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1992) p.6

    Google Scholar 

  17. Graeme Cheeseman, “Canada’s post-Cold War military blues and the lessons for Australia”, Pacifica Review, 13.2 (2001) p.174

    Article  Google Scholar 

  18. A token force of pilots and technicians were rotated through Europe as part of Canada’s contribution to NATO’s Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) programs. These personnel were withdrawn in 2014, again, for cost saving reasons. See Murray Brewster, “NATO surveillance programs withdrawal will cost Canada contracts”, The Canadian Press (5 August 2013), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/nato-surveillance-programs-withdrawal-will-cost-canada-contracts/article13598502/

    Google Scholar 

  19. Sokolsky, “Canada, getting it right this time: the 1994 Defence White Paper”, p. 11; Robert Michael Hartfiel, “Planning without guidance: Canadian defence policy and planning, 1993–2004”, Canadian Public Administration, 53:3 (2010) pp.327–28

    Article  Google Scholar 

  20. Philippe Lagasse & Paul Robinson, “Reviving realism in the Canadian defence debate”, (Kingston: Centre for International Relations, Queen’s University, 2008) p.32

    Google Scholar 

  21. Elinor Sloan, “The Revolution in Military Affairs: implications for Canada and NATO”, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002) p.123

    Google Scholar 

  22. David Perry, “The privatization of the Canadian military: Afghanistan and beyond”, International Journal, 63:4 (2009) p.690

    Google Scholar 

  23. Douglas L. Bland, “A sow’s ear from a milk purse: abandoning Canada’s military capabilities”, International Journal (Winter 1998–99) p.158

    Google Scholar 

  24. David Bercuson, “Up from the ashes: the re-professionalization of the Canadian Forces after the Somalia affair”, Canadian Military Journal, 9:3 (2009) pp. 31–39

    Google Scholar 

  25. Paul Mitchell, “A transformation agenda for the Canadian forces: full spectrum influence”, Canadian Military Journal, 4:4 (2003–04) p.55

    Google Scholar 

  26. Douglas L. Bland, “The fundamentals of national defence policy are not sound”, in Douglas L. Bland (ed.), “Canada without armed forces?” (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004) p. 22; Richler, “40 years of neglect, indifference, and apathy”, pp. 65–66

    Google Scholar 

  27. Michael K. Jeffery, “Inside Canadian forces transformation”, Canadian Military Journal, 10:2 (2010) p.10

    Google Scholar 

  28. Andrew Richler, “The Revolution in Military Affairs and its impact on Canada: the challenge and the consequences”, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999) p.9

    Google Scholar 

  29. Elinor Sloan, “Canada and The Revolution in Military Affairs: current response and future opportunities”, Canadian Military Journal, 1.3 (2000) p. 9.

    Google Scholar 

  30. Elinor Sloan, “Military transformation: key aspects and Canadian approaches” (Calgary: CDFAI, 2007) p.6

    Google Scholar 

  31. Department of National Defence, “The Canadian armed forces legacy in Afghanistan”, (accessed 2 April 2015), http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-past/cafla.page

    Google Scholar 

  32. David J. Bercuson & J. L. Granatstein, “Lessons learned? What Canada should learn from Afghanistan”, (Calgary: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2011) pp.1–2

    Google Scholar 

  33. For more information on the decision-making behind the Afghanistan deployments please see Janice Stein & Eugene Lang, “The unexpected war: Canada in Kandahar”, (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2007).

    Google Scholar 

  34. Kimberley Marten, “From Kabul to Kandahar: the Canadian forces and change”, American Review of Canadian Studies, 40:2 (2010) pp.214–36.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  35. Philippe Lagasse & Joel Sokolsky, “A larger ‘footprint’ in Ottawa: General Hillier and Canada’s shifting civil-military relationship”, Canadian Foreign Policy, 15:2 (2009) pp.16–40

    Article  Google Scholar 

  36. Paul Martin, “Hell or high water: my life in and out of politics”, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2008) pp.329–30

    Google Scholar 

  37. Donald Rumsfeld, “Transforming the military”, Foreign Affairs, 81:3 (2002) pp.21 & 25

    Article  Google Scholar 

  38. Rick J. Hillier, “Army transformation: punching above our weight”, The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin, 6:3 (2003) pp.3–4

    Google Scholar 

  39. Daniel Fitzsimmons, “Boy scouts no longer: a sociological institutionalist analysis of the Canadian forces”, Innovations: A Journal of Politics, 8 (2008–09) pp.16–17 & 19–20

    Google Scholar 

  40. Devin Conley & Eric Ouellet, “The Canadian forces and military transformation: an elusive quest for Efficiency”, Canadian Army Journal, 14:1 (2012) p.78

    Google Scholar 

  41. Daniel Schwartz, “What kind of military can Canada afford?” CBC News (12 November 2012) (accessed 2 April 2015) http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/what-kind-of-military-can-canada-afford-1.1230004

    Google Scholar 

  42. Department of National Defence, Defence Policy Statement (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2005)

    Google Scholar 

  43. Peter Jones and Philippe Lagasse, “Rhetoric versus reality: Canadian defence planning in a time of austerity”, Defense & Security Analysis, 28.2 (2012) p.143

    Article  Google Scholar 

  44. Campbell Clark, “MacKay orders revamp of Canadian Forces command”, The Globe and Mail, (4 May 2012), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/mackay-orders-revamp-of-canadian-forces-command/article4104781/

    Google Scholar 

  45. Allan English, “Outside CF transformation looking in”, Canadian Military Journal, 11:2 (2011) p.14

    Google Scholar 

  46. Alexander Gordon Salt, “Cultural differences: transformation and the future of American-Canadian defence relations”, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 20:3 (2014) p.266

    Article  Google Scholar 

  47. Department of National Defence, Canada First Defence Strategy, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2008)

    Google Scholar 

  48. David Pugliese, “The return of the Leopard”, The Ottawa Citizen (8 July 2006)

    Google Scholar 

  49. David Perry, “Canada’s seven billion dollar war”, International Journal, 63:3 (2008) pp.716–22

    Article  Google Scholar 

  50. Parliamentary Budget Officer, “Fiscal impact of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan”, (Ottawa: PBO, 2008) p.8

    Google Scholar 

  51. Department of National Defence, “Canadian Forces Transformation: New Operational Command and Control Structure”, Backgrounder (11 May 2012), http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=canadian-forces-transformation-new-operational-command-and-control-structure/hgq87xte

    Google Scholar 

  52. Ibid.; Andrew Leslie, “The Report on Transformation 2011” (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2011) pp. vii–ix

    Google Scholar 

  53. David Perry, “Leading from behind is still leading: Canada and the international intervention in Libya”, (Ottawa: CDAI, 2012) p.13.

    Google Scholar 

  54. Rachel Bryson, Katie Domansky, and Rebecca Jensen, “Canada in Libya: strategic lessons learned”, (Ottawa: Defence R&D Canada, 2012) p.21

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Copyright information

© 2015 Jeffrey Collins

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Collins, J. (2015). The Perpetual Search for Efficiency: The Canadian Approach to the RMA and Military Transformation. In: Collins, J., Futter, A. (eds) Reassessing the Revolution in Military Affairs. Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues and Policies. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137513762_4

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics