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Is There an Exceptional American Approach to Global Economic Governance?

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America, China, and the Struggle for World Order

Part of the book series: Asia Today ((ASIAT))

Abstract

Over the past two decades, the People’s Republic of China has entered into a dense web of international economic institutions.1 The United States, in turn, has attempted to exploit China’s turn toward the multilateral to advance its own interests. On issues ranging from intellectual property rights to climate change to macroeconomic surveillance, the United States has simultaneously welcomed China into multilateral structures while pressuring Beijing to embrace the spirit of global economic norms.2 This has been part and parcel of US foreign economic policy since the beginning of the post-1945 international economic order.3

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Notes

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  1. Daniel W. Drezner
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G. John Ikenberry Wang Jisi Zhu Feng

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© 2015 G. John Ikenberry, Wang Jisi, and Zhu Feng

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Drezner, D.W. (2015). Is There an Exceptional American Approach to Global Economic Governance?. In: Ikenberry, G.J., Jisi, W., Feng, Z. (eds) America, China, and the Struggle for World Order. Asia Today. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137508317_6

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