Is There an Exceptional American Approach to Global Economic Governance?

  • Daniel W. Drezner
Part of the Asia Today book series (ASIAT)


Over the past two decades, the People’s Republic of China has entered into a dense web of international economic institutions.1 The United States, in turn, has attempted to exploit China’s turn toward the multilateral to advance its own interests. On issues ranging from intellectual property rights to climate change to macroeconomic surveillance, the United States has simultaneously welcomed China into multilateral structures while pressuring Beijing to embrace the spirit of global economic norms.2 This has been part and parcel of US foreign economic policy since the beginning of the post-1945 international economic order.3


International Monetary Fund American Political Science Review International Financial Institution Bretton Wood System Foreign Economic Policy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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© G. John Ikenberry, Wang Jisi, and Zhu Feng 2015

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  • Daniel W. Drezner

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