In Search of Security and Self-Identity: Promise and Paradox of China’s Nuclear Weapons

Part of the Asia Today book series (ASIAT)


The study of China’s nuclear weapons program represents a paradox at best. On one hand, it is perhaps one of the most thoroughly combed issues, both by Western scholars1 and, more recently, by Chinese researchers;2 on the other hand, it is also an area of uncertainties, unknowns, and guesswork. This is the case despite the increasing effort, particularly from US scholars, and despite a growing trend in China, to demystify its weapons programs. As a result, the issue of transparency, or lack thereof, regarding the strength, scope, speed, and strategy of the Chinese nuclear forces—including the Second Artillery, its air and naval siblings, and China’s nuclear and aerospace industries—continues to be a source of concern for many.3


Foreign Policy Nuclear Weapon Foreign Affair Chinese Communist Party Nuclear Force 
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Copyright information

© G. John Ikenberry, Wang Jisi, and Zhu Feng 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bin Yu

There are no affiliations available

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