Sino-Soviet Relations in the 1970s and IR Theory

Abstract

On March 2, 1969, a group of Soviet border guards was ambushed while patrolling the Soviet-held islet of Damanskii / Zhenbaodao on the Ussuri River dividing the Soviet Union and China. About a fortnight later the Soviets retaliated, shelling the Chinese side. In August another skirmish erupted at the Sino-Soviet border in Xinjiang. Although the Soviet leaders probably did not seriously consider this option, Moscow publically floated hints of nuclear retaliation, and privately sought out American reaction to such a scenario. Mao Zedong had no intention to fight a war with the USSR. The threat of war permitted Mao to drum up support for the Cultural Revolution at home while showing the Soviets that China was a power to reckon with. Mao’s strategy misfired: by late summer war fever gripped China as the people were told to prepare for a long struggle with Soviet “social imperialism.” Mao began to contemplate ways to break out of isolation, which led to the Sino-American opening.