Further Motivation for Moderatism

Abstract

In this chapter, I offer further motivation to embrace the moderate position by considering in more detail some criticisms that can be leveled against both the liberal and the conservative view. I start by examining some additional worries against the liberal position when taken in connection with arguments such as Moore’s proof of an external world (§1). Matching the liberal position with Mooreanism — that is, the view that Moore’s argument is cogent and that it can produce a first justification to believe its conclusion — would seem to be a promising anti-skeptical strategy for a liberal to pursue, and indeed a very natural one given his views about the structure of perceptual justification. However, as we shall see, it runs into trouble. I then turn to Wright’s proposed way out of the skeptical outcome of the conservative position by appealing to the notion of entitlement, which I find wanting (§2) for several interconnected reasons. Finally, I critically consider some recent proposals, aimed at buttressing the idea that there are a priori independent warrants for the conclusion of arguments, such as Moore’s proof of an external world (§3), while, in some cases, attempting a combination with the liberal view. In particular, I consider the positions put forward by Ralph Wedgwood (§3.1), Christopher Peacocke (§3.2) and, very briefly, one recently presented by Ernie Sosa (§3.3).